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An inherently managerial commitment, functionalist/positivist theoretical 
orientation, and Western/U.S. bias characterize the dominant stream of crisis 
communication research and scholarship in the United States. These characteristics 
render analysis and assessment of crisis and crisis communication especially in non-
Western settings somewhat limited in scope and coverage. This limitation becomes all 
the more apparent when crisis is conceptualized as a social phenomenon, not merely an 
organizational one. Such conceptualization decenters the organization as the sole source 
of power to initiate crisis response and management, foregrounds the discursive terrain 
related to a crisis whereby multiple sources compete with their respective realities about 
the crisis, and thus challenges the dominant organization-centered logic of crisis 
communication research and scholarship in the U.S.  
This thesis presents a postcolonial theory-driven critical discourse analysis of 
news coverage on the collapse of a multistoried garment factory building in Bangladesh, 
which killed more than 1,100 people and wounded more than 2,000 others, and its 
aftermath, by two newspapers each from the United Kingdom, United States, and 
Bangladesh. The analysis illustrates how (re)conceptualizing crisis as social phenomenon 
and crisis communication as discourse destabilizes certain taken-for-granted assumptions 
that undergird the dominant crisis communication scholarship and research in the U.S. 
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Two contrasting features, namely, a rapid proliferation of research and a slow 
pace of theory building, have marked the emergence of crisis communication as “a 
distinctive area of study” (Coombs, 2010, p. 477). The modern history of crisis 
communication began with the “notoriety created by Johnson & Johnson Company’s 
successful handling of the Tylenol scare in 1982” (Heath & O’Hair, 2009, p. 5). In more 
than 30 years since, although the number of published works on crisis communication has 
increased significantly (An & Cheng, 2012; Ha & Boynton, 2014), theory building has 
been slow (Fisherman, 1999). Debates continue as to if there is or should be a unique and 
independent crisis literature, and disagreements about the usefulness of proposing a 
unifying metatheory for crisis communication research remain largely unresolved (Heath, 
2012). Meanwhile, certain theories (e.g., situational crisis communication theory, image 
restoration theory, apologia theory) have frequently been, and continue to be, cited while 
many published works do not even propose research questions or hypotheses based on 
theories (An & Cheng, 2012). Falkheimer and Heide (2006) also complained of an 
absence of “systemic knowledge and theoretical framework analysis” (p. 180) in crisis 
communication research. As such, I argue, mainstream crisis communication research in 
the United States has remained somewhat limited in its scope and coverage, especially in 
respect of analyzing and assessing crisis communication in a non-Western setting. 
I begin with a review of different definitions of crisis and crisis communication, 
arguing that these definitions project unidimensional and unidirectional views, and are 
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designed and deployed primarily to protect the interest of an organization in crisis. Then, 
I proceed with an examination of the trends in contemporary crisis communication 
research, tracing its roots in, and tying its modus operandi with, public relations research. 
Here, I also discuss how mainstream research on public relations, and subsequently crisis 
communication, in the U.S. has taken a distinctively different route than the one taken by 
organizational communication research. The discussion is relevant because of the use of 
organizational communication as an expansive term to cover any type of communication 
that the organization engages in, including public relations and crisis communication 
(Johansson, 2007). This difference in research trends, I argue, is constitutive of certain 
biases that characterize dominant crisis communication research and scholarship in the 
U.S. Later, I articulate the purpose of the thesis, and introduce the case I will analyze for 
the thesis, and explain the reasons why I have chosen it. Finally, I detail the chapter 
outline for the thesis. 
Definitions of Crisis and Crisis Communication 
Multiple definitions of crisis have emerged over the years; however, each 
conceptualization shares certain common assumptions. Fearn-Banks (1996/2002) defined 
crisis as “a major occurrence with a potentially negative outcome affecting the 
organization, company, or industry, as well as its publics, products, services or good 
name” that “interrupts normal business transactions and can sometimes threaten the 
existence of the organization” (p. 2). Seeger, Sellnow, and Ulmer (2003) viewed crisis as 
“a specific, unexpected, non-routine event or series of events which creates high levels of 
uncertainty, and significant or perceived threat to an organization’s high priority goals” 
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(p. 7). Meanwhile, Heath (1995) defined crisis as risk manifested or, in other words, the 
fallout of a risk either ignored or not effectively addressed. Hearit and Courtright (2003) 
summarized crisis as “a generally predictable series of events that occurs when an 
organization’s values are under assault by an external agent or there is a perception that 
an organization has committed some wrongdoing” (p. 83). A common theme that 
emerges from these definitions, despite their different points of emphasis, is that a crisis 
disrupts an organization’s normal operations and compromises its reputation. 
Similarly, the varying definitions of crisis communication also have common 
themes across each conceptualization. Fearn-Banks (1996/2002) defined crisis 
communication as “the dialog between the organization and its publics prior to, during, 
and after the negative occurrence” that is “designed to minimize damage to the image of 
the organization” (p. 2). Notably, public in crisis communication does not mean people in 
general; public or publics in crisis communication denote certain groups of people (e.g., 
employees, customers, stakeholders, board members) on whom an organization 
“depends… for survival because they have some stake in the organization” (p. 3). 
Coombs (2012) defined crisis communication as “the collection, processing, and 
dissemination of information required to address a crisis situation” (p. 20). Seeger and 
Sellnow (2013), on the other hand, argued that crisis communication could be understood 
as “the ongoing process of creating shared meaning among and between groups, 
communities, individuals and agencies, within the ecological context of a crisis, for the 
purpose of preparing for and reducing, limiting and responding to threats and harms” 
(p. 13). These definitions are built on the assumption that crisis communication is a 
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practice and strategy intended to protect and promote, and repair and restore the 
image/reputation of a crisis-hit organization. 
A key concept that characterizes the definition of both crisis and crisis 
communication is perception. For example, Coombs (2009) suggested that crisis is 
“largely perceptual” and that “[i]f stakeholders believe there is a crisis, the organization is 
in a crisis unless it can successfully persuaders it is not” (p. 99). Thus, he postulated crisis 
communication as a practice that seeks to “influence how the stakeholders react to the 
crisis and the organization in crisis” (p. 100). Hearit and Courtright (2003) also 
emphasized the perceptual dimension in their postulation of crisis communication in 
terms of “terminological influence” to “symbolically ‘resolve’ the crisis by 
argumentatively altering perceptions in a manner favorable to organizational interests” 
(p. 83). Inherent in these definitions is the recognition that multiple perceptions exist 
surrounding a crisis event but the emphasis, again, is to ensure that only one of these 
perceptions prevails, the one that favors the organization’s interest. 
Overall, the different definitions of both crisis and crisis communication have at 
their core an overarching concern and consideration for the organization’s interests. This 
centrality of the organization’s interests in crisis communication and crisis 
communication research, as I discuss in the next section, is an inheritance from public 
relations and public relations research. 
Trends in Crisis Communication Research 
Crisis communication remains essentially an extension of public relations as an 
area of both practice and research. Fearn-Banks (2009) observed that crisis has generally 
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driven the profession of public relations and that most public relations programs are 
about either recovering from or preventing a crisis. Moreover, a great deal of crisis 
communication scholarship draws on public relations research and practices (Coombs, 
2012; Falkheimer & Heide, 2006), and a sizeable majority of crisis communication 
research is produced by academic experts on public relations and corporate reputation 
(Heath, 2012). It is, thus, important to contextualize crisis communication research within 
the broader discipline of public relations (Coombs, 2010). Such a contextualization is 
also necessary to understand the public relations focus in crisis communication research, 
which, I argue, is at the heart of some of its other biases. At the same time, it is necessary 
as well to distinguish public relations and crisis communication research from 
organizational communication research. Although organizational communication is 
generally understood to be an umbrella term for whatever communication that an 
organization engages in, including public relations and crisis communication, public 
relations and crisis communication research has taken a distinctively different route from 
organizational communication research. The difference is discussed in the next section. 
Disconnect between Organizational Communication and Public Relations Research 
Organizational communication research barely provides the context for 
understanding the trend in public relations research. Public relations, in fact, has had little 
to no space in organizational communication research. Most organizational 
communication scholars have maintained a distinction between communication within 
and beyond the organization, regarding “most communication aimed at external 
audiences…as alien to the field” (Cheney & Christensen, 2001a, p. 231; emphasis in 
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original). They also dismissed public relations as “too closely tied with a particular 
profession” (Cheney & Christensen, 2001b, p. 170). Questions and concerns of 
professionals and practitioners have always driven the public relations research agenda, 
and professionals and practitioners predominantly conducted early public relations 
research (Karlberg, 1996). Moreover, public relations research has often been sponsored 
and thus seen as “wed to the self-interest of specific clients” (p. 265). These reasons 
could well explain the historical reluctance of many organizational communication 
scholars to associate with, let alone own, public relations. 
That said, public relations scholars are no less to blame for the “lack of 
interaction, networking, and cross-fertilization of ideas” because they “have tended to 
avoid contact with organizational communication, at conferences as well as in the pages 
of communication journals” (Cheney & Christensen, 2001b, p. 170). This preference for 
a closed network may be a reason why “[p]robably more than any other subdivision of 
communication, public relations has developed its own specialized journals, professional 
and scholarly associations, publishers, and network of collaborative relationships” (Botan 
& Taylor, 2004, p. 646). Subsequently, with public relations researchers rarely publishing 
their works in other journals, communication and mass communication researchers have 
not had wide access to public relation scholarship and the erroneous understanding of 
public relations as “an applied technical area” has persisted. 
Of late, though, communication scholars, especially in Europe, have begun to 
argue against the internal-external communication divide in general and the 
organizational communication-public relations disconnect in particular, postulating 
7 
“strategic communication” as a “transboundary concept that captures the complex 
phenomenon of an organization’s targeted communication processes” (Falkheimer & 
Heide, 2014, p. 124). Yet, this counterintuitive and counterproductive mutual exclusivity 
continues to characterize the relationship, or lack thereof, between organizational 
communication and public relations research. Moreover, public relations research has 
also had a distinctively different theoretical orientation than that of organizational 
communication. It has typically had a functionalist approach with the focus on 
“techniques and production of strategic organizational messages” (Botan & Taylor, 2004, 
p. 651). This functionalist theoretical approach has also been transferred to crisis 
communication research and scholarship because of its predominantly public relations 
focus, which is discussed in the next section. 
Public Relations Focus 
To understand the public relations focus in crisis communication research, it is 
first necessary to examine the conceptualization of public relations in contemporary 
scholarship. Berger (1999) likened the conceptualization of public relations with “a 
process intended to construct an ideological worldview… a self-interested and partial 
representation of the world based on a particular set of beliefs, ideas, attitudes, and 
objectives” (p. 186). Most organizations, as Grunig (1989) argued, seek to construct a 
worldview where they know best and where the public “would willingly ‘cooperate’ with 
the organization” if they “had ‘the big picture’ or understood the organization,” and 
should do so for their own benefit (p. 32). So, the objective is to create ‘the big picture’ 
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or, to put it differently, the organization’s version of the reality, and persuade publics into 
buying it. 
Crisis communication apparently has a similar focus: propagating a ‘big picture’ 
that minimizes or condones an organization’s responsibility and/or culpability for a crisis. 
The emphasis is on “strategies and processes that organizations ought to take to secure 
favorable positions in times of crisis” (Kim & Dutta, 2009) and “avoid legal sanctions 
and punitive damages” (Waymer & Heath, 2007, p. 88). The transference of the public 
relations focus to crisis communication research is largely due to the fact that crisis 
communication scholars are “mostly based in public relations” and interested in 
“protecting and defending an organization’s reputation” (Falkheimer & Heide, 2009, 
p. 56). In other words, with public relations scholars conducting much of the research, 
crisis communication is bound to have a public relations focus. 
Informal vs. Formal Research 
That questions and concerns of professionals and practitioners have driven the 
research agenda has also been a contributive factor. In fact, as Coombs (2012) noted, 
practitioners authored initial crisis communication research for non-academic journals, 
describing cases without any analytic framework. Subsequently, academics took up crisis 
communication research for publication in academic journals, and “introduced specific 
theoretical frameworks or principles for analyzing cases” (Coombs, 2012, p. 23). 
However, crisis communication research has remained predominantly concerned with 
developing best practices for crisis managers on how to protect and defend the 
organization’s image/reputation. 
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Formulation of tactical (e.g., how organizational spokespeople people should 
interact with the media) and strategic (e.g., how organizational spokespeople should align 
their messages with organizational objectives) advices, in other words, remain the 
mainstays of crisis communication research. In making a distinction between informal 
and formal crisis communication research, Coombs (2012) argued that the former 
employs such rhetorical theories as corporate apologia, image restoration, and renewal 
discourse “to dissect and to interpret cases and to generate insights into crisis 
communication” (p. 30) while the latter theories like situational crisis communication to 
explain and predict how particular crises necessitate particular communicative responses. 
However, I argue, the distinction is more often stylistic than substantive since both 
formal and informal research in crisis communication ultimately have the common 
objective of developing tactical and strategic advices for crisis communicators. 
For example, as per Coombs’s distinction, Littlefield and Quenette’s (2007) study 
is informal since it drew on Kenneth Burke’s perspectives on “the nature, functions, and 
consequences of language as symbolic action” to explain how the media framed the crisis 
response from the federal, state, and local governments and agencies in the aftermath of 
Hurricane Katrina (p. 28). On the contrary, Liska, Petrun, Sellnow, and Seeger’s (2012) 
study, which employs chaos theory to explain predictive and explanatory ineffectiveness 
of the local authorities’ crisis communication efforts, belongs to the formal research 
category. Yet, in terms of objective, both essentially sought to offer insights into how 
organizational spokespersons should not communicate (i.e., tactical) and formulate 
message (i.e., strategic) at times of crises. I would also argue that Coombs’s (2012) 
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classification of informal crisis communication on the basis of corporate apologia, image 
restoration, and discourse renewal is rather tenuous since these frameworks should be 
viewed as parts of a continuum. In fact, image restoration and renewal rhetoric both draw 
on corporate apologia’s denial, bolstering, differentiation, and transcendence strategies. 
Overall, crisis communication research remains, largely, unidirectional in its 
objective (i.e., formulation of tactical and strategic advices for organizational managers) 
and unidimensional in its orientation (i.e. assessment and evaluation of communication in 
terms of effectiveness). These objectives and orientations ultimately account for its 
inherent biases and weaknesses that have rendered crisis communication research 
deficient by ignoring areas of investigation that should be a part of its purview. In the 
ensuing section, I discuss the managerial and Western/U.S. biases, and exclusively 
positivist/functionalist disposition of dominant crisis communication research, and how 
these factors limits its scope and coverage, especially in terms of crises in non-Western 
settings. The discussion also sets the stage for articulation of the rationale and purpose of 
my study, and introduction of the case I have analyzed. 
Weaknesses in Crisis Communication Research and Scholarship 
Much of crisis communication research has followed a somewhat predictable 
pattern, from describing the crisis event to explaining its cause to evaluating the 
effectiveness of an organization’s communication through its different stages (e.g., Cole 
& Fellows, 2008; Hearit & Courtright, 2003). Researchers have generally investigated 
crisis events and consequent responses, communicative and otherwise, with the same set 
of variables, not recognizing factors (e.g., culture and race) that play crucial roles in 
11 
instigating crisis and influencing crisis response. Such inflexibility of research orientation 
boils down to researchers’ commitment to a managerial perspective, inclination to 
positivist theorizing, and bias to the West/U.S.  
Managerial Bias  
Dominant crisis communication scholarship in the U.S. views crisis from an 
organizational perspective (i.e., as a disruption in normal operations, and a threat to 
image/reputation) even when an organization may be responsible for the crisis (e.g., 
Liska et al., 2012). Consequently, crisis management and response is driven by a logic of 
organizational damage control in terms of image and economics. However, as Heath 
(2012) noted, it is often the case that ordinary people suffer infinitely more than 
organization’s owners and managers. The Bhopal tragedy is a case in point. Although 
more than 3,000 people were killed and thousands more were affected in the aftermath of 
the deadly gas leak from the Union Carbide plant, crisis communication researchers were 
more interested in “the role of rhetorical strategies in repairing damaged corporate 
relationships” (Waymer & Heath 2007, p. 94). Kim and Dutta (2009) attributed such 
marginalization of victims in mainstream crisis communication literature to “the 
managerial commitments of crisis communication researchers” (p. 143). The managerial 
bias, as discussed previously, is an inheritance from the broader discipline of public 
relations. 
Such a bias is apparent in the suggestions that researchers offer for effective crisis 
communication. Although Coombs (2012) asserted that recent research, especially on 
renewal discourse, emphasizes how the audiences “react to crisis events and crisis 
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response strategies,” instead of examining “the messages the crisis managers create” and 
inferring their “effects on the audience” (p. 35), it is anything but a shift from 
organizational to public perspective. The study by Smith, Coffelt, Rives, and Sollitto 
(2012) is instructive in this regard. They interviewed 29 victims of the 2009 ice storm in 
Kentucky and found out that they “remembered their overall experience through positive 
terms and positive interpersonal communication” (p. 53). The finding led the researchers 
to conclude that “message designers for organizations, media outlets, and governmental 
agencies should be mindful of the unique attributes of the victims they serve and 
determine if positive communication can occur post-crisis” (p. 53). Simply put, the 
audience perspective and perception is important insofar as it helps the organization 
improve its crisis communication efficacy, meaning that the organizational perspective 
ultimately holds the upper hand.  
Positivist Theorizing 
The prevalent managerial bias or commitment informs the theoretical orientation 
of crisis communication research, which is overwhelmingly positivist in paradigm 
whereby communication is “conceived as simple expression,” and “evaluated in terms of 
its effectiveness” (Mumby, 1997, p. 4), and rhetorical in tradition whereby 
communication problems are viewed as “social exigencies that can be resolved through 
the artful use of discourse” (Craig, 1999, p. 135). Notably, as Curtin and Gaither (2005) 
and Karlberg (1996) pointed out, the emphasis is on formulation of persuasive messages 
towards effective diffusion of crisis. Simply put, dominant crisis communication 
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scholarship invests in a linear transmission-based model where the information flow is 
unidirectional, from the organization to the public.  
The most commonly cited and/or employed theories in dominant crisis 
communication research (e.g., corporate apologia, image repair/restoration, renewal 
discourse, situational crisis communication theory, attribution theory) are grounded in 
empiricist epistemology (i.e., reality can be knowable through systematic observation), 
non-actional ontology (i.e., meaning is predetermined), and value-neutral axiology (i.e., 
scholarship is value free) (Littlejohn, 2002). In other words, crisis communication 
research is largely invested in the understanding that meaning lies in the text and is 
independent of context, and, most importantly, that meaning is preordained and the 
receiver (the public) essentially deciphers the message as intended by the sender (the 
organization). Thus, most literature conceptualizes the efficacy of a crisis message rests 
in how the organization formulates it. 
Such an understanding discounts any role an individual’s interpretation may have 
in the process of communication, let alone their culture, ethnicity, sex, gender, age, and 
so on. Troublingly, dominant crisis communication treats individuals as being above and 
beyond their identity — cultural, ethnic and otherwise. Furthermore, there is an 
underlying assumption that people across geographic and cultural borders react and 
respond to crisis and crisis messages as Westerners/Americans do. As Lee (2005) noted, 
not only is there a scarcity of crisis communication studies in non-Western cultures, the 
very “conception of crisis communication is dominated by and unchallenged in a 
Western-oriented paradigm” (p. 276). What this West/U.S.-centricity does, as I argue 
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later, is that it renders the dominant theoretical framework inadequate and/or ineffective 
to analyze and assess crisis communication in a non-Western setting. 
Western/U.S. Bias 
Explanations on why much of crisis communication research in the U.S. focuses 
on crisis and crisis response in the Western/U.S. setting range from the benign to the 
baneful. The most charitable explanation could be that theorizing in public relations and, 
by extension, crisis communication has mostly “taken place in the United States… and 
[is]… based on empirical evidence gathered by analyzing U.S. organizations” 
(Sriramesh, 1996, p. 171). However, as Lee (2005) argued, it could very well be 
reflective of “underlying ethnocentrism among researchers and practitioners” (p. 287). It 
could also be an “‘America knows best’ cultural worldview” (Wakefield, 1996, p. 25) 
that frames Western scholars’ explanations and evaluations of crisis communication 
regardless of contexts or geographic and cultural borders.  
Such ethnocentrism may, in fact, be typical of cross-cultural communication 
studies in general. Yum (1988) complained of a tendency in cross-cultural 
communication studies to “simply describe the foreign communication patterns and then 
compare them to those of North America” without quite going “beyond the surface to 
explore the roots of such differences” (p. 374). In their theorizing of crisis and crisis 
communication in settings outside the West/U.S., crisis communication scholars have 
displayed a similar tendency. Heath and O’Hair (2009) observed that understanding crisis 
communication requires examination of “the nature of people and the society they build” 
and “insight into society as a foundation” (p. 5). Yet, when it comes to crisis in non-
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Western settings, theorizing has been done with theoretical frameworks developed in and 
for Western/U.S. context. In the next section, a few such cases are discussed. 
Crisis in non-Western Settings 
A number of crisis communication studies in non-Western contexts exemplify the 
way that Western theorization constrains scholarship in the crisis communication field. 
For example, Liu, McIntyre, and Sellnow (2008) employed narrative theory to analyze 
the Chinese government’s crisis communication exercise in the wake of the SARS 
outbreak. They demonstrated how it successfully used the state-owned newspaper to 
advance a heroism narrative, highlighting the efforts of healthcare workers to contain the 
outbreak and ensure proper care of the afflicted, thus restoring public faith in its ability to 
manage the epidemic. Heath, Li, Bowen, and Lee (2008) also analyzed and assessed the 
official crisis communication during the SARS outbreak in China. Their focus, however, 
was on how the initial narrative that the Chinese government espoused proved 
dysfunctional in a culture of secrecy and noncooperation that pervades Chinese society. 
Overall, albeit conducted in non-Western settings, these studies, too, focused exclusively 
on the organizational perspective of crisis and positivist/functionalist understanding of 
communication that characterize dominant Western notions of crisis communication.  
The social dimension of crisis is largely absent from such studies, be it in Western 
or non-Western contexts. Of course, exceptions are there. For example, Thombre (2008) 
highlighted the domination of denial, dismissal, dread, and discrimination in the 
dominant discourses over HIV/AIDS pandemic in India, arguing how such discourses 
could precipitate an unthinkable crisis in one of the most populous countries in the world. 
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He also advanced a coherence discourse aimed at “creating a model of comprehensive 
dialogue-based prevention programs that are backed by holistic care, treatment, and 
support services” and “broader involvement of families and communities, keeping in 
mind different contexts, cultures, and resources” (p. 194). This focus on contexts, 
cultures, and resources becomes rather unavoidable when crisis is defined for not just its 
organizational dimensions but also its social ramifications (Heath & O’Hair, 2009), 
something that dominant U.S.-driven crisis communication scholarship has largely not 
done so far. 
Such a (re)definition of crisis is not possible within an organization/manager-
centric, positivism/functionalism-driven, and Western/U.S.-biased crisis communication 
research. Several scholars (e.g., Kim & Dutta, 2009; McHale, Zompetti & Moffitt, 2007; 
Waymer & Heath, 2007) challenged the largely uncontested logic of crisis 
communication and its ideological assumptions, advancing analytical frameworks 
grounded in theories belonging to critical (e.g., hegemonic theory) and postmodernist 
(e.g., subaltern theory) paradigm. However, these scholars and their studies constitute a 
minority in contemporary crisis communication scholarship. My thesis project, described 
in the ensuing section, continues with the conversation these scholars have initiated. 
The Purpose of the Thesis Project 
This thesis project looks at a crisis in a non-Western setting, namely the Rana 
Plaza collapse and its aftermath in Bangladesh, from a theoretical perspective rarely used 
in contemporary crisis communication research and scholarship, namely postcolonial 
theory. As indicated in the preceding section, one of the purposes of my thesis project is 
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to challenge the dominant logic of contemporary U.S.-based crisis communication 
research and scholarship by foregrounding the social dimension of crisis. Such a 
disruption can complicate the understanding of crisis and crisis communication in several 
ways. For example, crisis could be understood in terms of social discourse (Davis & 
French, 2008) or in terms of competing social realities constructed by different 
stakeholders (McHale et al., 2007). In such understanding of crisis, context, and not 
merely text, becomes crucial in crisis communication. 
To understand the crisis communication surrounding the Rana Plaza incident, the 
thesis project analyzes the news coverage of the industrial disaster by the local and 
international print media. The reason to select media text for analysis is twofold: first, the 
media are regarded as a crucial conduit for crisis communication; and two, there are 
many instances whereby the media informed and influenced social discourse on 
individual and collective identities (e.g., Mădroane, 2012; Sing, 2011).  
Crisis communication scholars are unanimous in their recognition of the centrality 
of the media’s role in the information dissemination and knowledge management 
objectives of crisis communication (Coombs, 2010; Veil & Ojeda, 2010). Sellnow and 
Seeger (2013) emphasized the media’s “central role in crisis communication” for their 
capacity for rapid dissemination of “information to mass audiences during crises” 
(pp. 138–139). Fearn-Banks (2009), in fact, designated the media as the conduit for 
organizational crisis communication and ranked organizational relations with the media 
as one of the ten best practices related to crisis communication. Meanwhile, Holladay 
(2009) suggested that organizations should actively participate in the “crisis framing 
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process” to have “a positive influence” on how the media report a crisis (p. 216). This 
suggestion is understandable in view of the media’s propensity to transition from being 
“a vehicle providing the public with information to clarify the chaos surrounding the start 
of the crisis” to “assuming a privileged position of pointing blame toward legitimate 
authorities” (Littlefield & Quenette, 2007, pp. 27-28). This suggestion also reflects a 
recognition of the media’s capacity to create a crisis of public perception for an 
organization even when the organization’s action does not warrant it. For example, 
Sellnow and Sellnow (2014), and Spence, Lachlan, Lin, Sellnow-Richmond, and Sellnow 
(2015) studied how the media may negatively frame an organization’s standard operating 
procedure through exemplars, created through frequent use of shocking visuals and 
catchphrases. Overall, the suggestion for organizations to actively work with the media 
underscores the knowledge management function of crisis communication. 
Critical communication scholars often point to the existence of multiple 
contrasting and contesting discourses surrounding a crisis event (e.g., Hearit & 
Courtright, 2003; McHale et al., 2007). The news media play a dual role in crisis 
discourse: convey and contribute. Most importantly, they shape the crisis discourse, using 
“nuanced language and labels… to both facilitate and to limit knowledge about social 
phenomena” while maintaining “[the] pretense of neutrality” (Davis & French, 2008, 
pp. 245-246). These nuanced language and labels structure public perceptions about crisis 
events, discursively constructing, in other words, the phenomena on the one hand and the 
identities of those involved. Such discursive constructions of phenomena (e.g., “tragedy” 
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or “disaster”) and identities (e.g., “victims” or “survivors”) are seldom neutral or natural 
but almost always political (van Dijk, 2001). 
In view of such realities relating to the media’s role in social discourse 
surrounding crisis events, the purpose of the thesis is ultimately twofold: to identify 
differences in discursive (re)construction by the local and global news media of the Rana 
Plaza tragedy and the identities of the people who experienced it; and to explore how 
these differences are informed by postcolonial awareness or neocolonial/imperial 
impulses. 
The Rana Plaza as a Crisis 
The collapse of Rana Plaza at Savar in Bangladesh was the worst industrial 
accident in South Asia since the leak of deadly gas from the Union Carbide plant in 
Bhopal, India, left at least 3,800 people dead (“Disaster in Bangladesh,” 2013). It was 
inarguably the worst industrial disaster in the readymade garment industry in Bangladesh 
and, for that matter, anywhere in the world. However, it was not the first time that a 
factory building had collapsed in Bangladesh: 
 
Building collapses are unsettlingly common, especially in the overcrowded capital 
where construction laws are frequently ignored. An estimated 500 people have 
been killed in similar disasters over the past decade, including 73 garment 
workers in a similar factory collapse in Savar in April 2005. (Campbell, 2013) 
 
Also unsettlingly common are fire incidents in readymade garment factories. Exactly six 
months before the collapse of Rana Plaza, a devastating fire at an apparel factory at 
Ashulia, on the outskirts of the capital Dhaka, left 112 workers killed. A subsequent 
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government inquiry found “a host of violations at Tazreen Fashions” (Manik & Yardley, 
2012):  
 
Managers on some floors closed collapsible gates to block workers from running 
down the staircases, the ground-floor warehouse was illegal and the building’s 
escape plan improper, and the factory lacked a required closed-circuit television 
monitoring system. None of the fire extinguishers in the factory appeared to have 
been used on the night of the fire, suggesting poor preparedness and training.  
 
The inquiry recommended that the owner of the factory should be pressed with criminal 
charges for “unpardonable negligence.” Yet, it took international pressure, sustained 
protests in Bangladesh, and more than a year to have the owner of the factory behind 
bars. It was not until January 2016 that his trial began in the court of law. 
In case of the Rana Plaza tragedy, a high-level government inquiry, which 
reported its findings within a month of the incident, indicated that the building’s collapse 
was a long time in the making (Yardley, 2013). First and foremost, substandard materials 
were used during the construction of the building while building codes were blatantly 
disregarded. In fact, the government inquiry accused the mayor of the local municipality 
of unlawfully granting approval for the construction of the building, named Rana Plaza 
after its owner Sohel Rana. Moreover, it was built on a piece of land developed through 
earth-filling of a pond. Besides, while the approvals were for five stories, Mr. Rana 
constructed three additional levels; these floors were rented out to readymade garment 
factories that employed several thousand workers. Large power generators were also 
placed on these floors, which were necessary because of frequent power outages, a 
regular feature in Bangladesh. The poorly constructed building would shake ominously 
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whenever the generators were switched on. Apparently, the owner of Rana Plaza and the 
factory bosses chose to ignore the risk that they were putting the apparel workers as well 
as other tenants of the building. 
Then, again, on the day before the collapse, cracks developed in the building, 
making so much noise and shaking the structure so much that many workers fled the 
building and refused to come back. An engineer was called in, to inspect the cracks; he 
concluded that the building was unsafe. The engineer appeared on a private television 
channel saying that he had told Mr. Rana, after his inspection that the building should be 
evacuated because it was not safe (“Bangladesh Official: Disaster Not,” 2013). He also 
claimed that he had asked government engineers that the building needed to be examined 
further.  
Meanwhile, the police had ordered that the building be evacuated and, within 
hours after cracks had developed in the building, the branch of a private commercial bank 
and several other shops housed in the lower floors evacuated. The next morning, 
however, Mr. Rana, a local leader of the ruling Awami League’s youth wing, dismissed 
the engineer’s warning and widespread concern about the building’s safety as “nothing 
serious” (Campbell, 2013). He and owners of the clothing factories ordered the workers 
into the building on the morning of the fateful day. Soon after they went in, there was a 
power outage and the heavy generators were switched on, shaking the weakened 
structure. In about 15 minutes, the building came crashing down on the hapless hundreds. 
The rescue operation was itself at the receiving end of widespread complaints and 
controversies:  
22 
The rescue operation was a fiasco, with the area not even cordoned off. Tens of 
thousands of bystanders besieged the site, some entering the wreckage. Soldiers 
and firemen were present, but it was mostly left to locals to drag out survivors and 
corpses. At one point bystanders pelted volunteers with stones for making such 
slow progress, prompting police to use tear gas. Every day the stench of rotting 
bodies grew. (“Disaster in Bangladesh,” 2013) 
 
When the rescue efforts were officially called off, about three weeks after the building 
collapsed, the death toll had topped 1,100 and many workers still remained unaccounted 
for. 
Just as in the case of the Tazreen Fashions factory fire, the Rana Plaza cases have 
gone through delays and deferments. Mr. Rana, the owner of Rana Plaza who had gone 
into hiding immediately after the collapse, was arrested near the Bangladesh-India border 
on April 28, 2013. It took the police more than two years to press charges of culpable 
homicide and negligence against him and 41 others in three criminal cases on June 1, 
2015. Worse still, the trial began only in June 2016. While Mr. Rana, the prime accused, 
and five others are in jail, 23 are out on bail and 13 others remain fugitive (Islam, 2016). 
Given the notorious backlog of cases in Bangladesh’s judicial system, justice could be 
delayed indefinitely, if not denied altogether. Thus, it comes as little surprise that one of 
the survivors of the Rana Plaza tragedy, who lost her husband in the building collapse, 
wondered “the culprits will be punished” (Manik & Najar, 2015). 
Proposed Chapter Outline of Thesis 
The thesis has four more chapters. In Chapter 2, I review the literature on 
postcolonial theory, and crisis, media and news framing, leading to the two research 
questions that will guide my thesis. In Chapter 3, I explain and justify my use of critical 
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discourse analysis as my research methodology, and also my source of data. In Chapter 4, 
I present the data analysis. In Chapter 5, I first discuss the implications of my research, in 
view of the limitations that I have identified in the dominant crisis communication 






REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
The dominant crisis communication scholarship in the U.S. is driven by an 
organizational/managerial commitment, characterized by a positivist/functionalist 
understanding of communication, and grounded in a Western/U.S. bias. These multiple 
biases make crisis communication research somewhat limited in scope and coverage, 
especially where a crisis in non-Western settings is analyzed. To break away from such 
rigidity and predictability, I argue, a foregrounding of the social dimension of crisis is 
needed. This, as I have discussed and sought to demonstrate in the previous chapter, 
complicates our understanding of crisis communication in several ways. I am especially 
interested in understanding how local and global media outlets contributed to the 
discursive (re)construction of the crisis in the aftermath of the Rana Plaza incident in 
Bangladesh. 
Bangladesh is a country with a strong postcolonial legacy. The nation had been 
ruled by the British colonizers as part of the Indian subcontinent and then by the West 
Pakistan-based political and military elite before it secured its political freedom in 1971 
after about nine months of bloody armed struggle. At the same time, Bangladesh has been 
swept by the globalization of capitalist economy and transnational media, with the two 
working hand in hand “to ideologically condition a moral order, to transform the way 
people conceptualize their lives, shape common sense, or even to limit the boundaries of 
imagination” (Artz, 2003, p. 56). In other words, social discourse in Bangladesh is in the 
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midst of contrary pulls of colonial legacy, postcolonial awareness, and 
neocolonial/imperial impulse. 
Again, as Davis and French (2008) argued, the media do more than disseminate 
information during a crisis; they shape social discourse about the crisis and discursively 
(re)produce identities of those affected by it. News-framing is often the process that 
media organizations employ in such discursive (re)construction of a crisis and also the 
identities of the individuals and institutions it affects. I am, thus, interested in examining, 
through a postcolonial theoretical lens, how the media, both local and global, frame the 
Rana Plaza tragedy and discursively (re)construct the crisis and the identities of 
individuals affected by the crisis. As such, in this section, I proceed with a review of the 
literature, first on postcolonial theory, and then on crisis and news framing. The review 
culminates in the research questions for the thesis project. 
Postcolonial Theory 
Postcolonial theory is often defined in terms of what it does, rather than what it is. 
For example, Burney (2012) noted that it has been used as a “critical tool” to deconstruct 
the underlying layers, structures, and forms that are embedded in the colonial past and the 
postcolonial present” and as a “theoretical lens” to critique “[w]ide-ranging issue relating 
to nationalism, history, socio-economics, geopolitics, and international relations” (p. 42). 
Nayar (2010), on the other hand, defined postcolonial theory as “a method of interpreting, 
reading and critiquing the cultural practices of colonialism, where it proposes that the 
exercise of colonial power is also the exercise of racially determined powers of 
representation” (p. 25). Others have defined postcolonialism as a wide array of critical 
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practices that seeks to “dismantle the West as the normative center of the world, to move 
beyond West-centered historicism, beyond imperial binary structures of Self/Other and 
center/periphery, and ultimately beyond any form of imperialism” (Rao, 2011, p. 792). In 
other words, postcolonial theory has been conceptualized as a critical tool, a method of 
reading and interpretation, a conglomeration of critical practices, so on and so forth. 
Its origin is also contested. Orientalism (1978) is often dubbed the precursor to 
postcolonial studies, and its author, Edward Said, as its father, “a paternity he strenuously 
denied but a designation he could not escape” (Parry, 2013, p. 107). Then, of course, 
there is the school of thought that traced postcolonial discourse in the work of Franz 
Fanon, for example. What is, however, beyond doubt is that the works of Said and Fanon 
were instrumental in the emergence of colonial discourse analysis, which also explains 
“modern colonialism and imperialism as integral to capitalism’s beginnings, expansion, 
and ultimate global entrenchment” (p. 107). Said, in particular, introduced a new way to 
make meaning of texts, literary and otherwise, and interrogated the hitherto taken-for-
granted assumption that canonical Western literature, especially as it pertained to how the 
Orient was conceptualized or, to use his own word, imagined, was above and beyond the 
worldliness of politics. 
Said’s (1978) interrogation of Orientalism, the study of the Orient in post-
Enlightenment Europe, was predicated on two core arguments. First, the “ontological and 
epistemological distinction” (p. 2) between the Occident and the Orient was as imagined 
as the geographical boundaries between the West and the East; and second, production of 
such distinctions and, for that matter, the Orientalist discourse in general was inherently 
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part of a greater political project. The central thesis of Said’s text was that Orientalism 
was essentially designed to argue for, and thus legitimize, intervention—political, 
cultural, and even military—by the European powers. His argument, at the time, was seen 
as blasphemous due to the way it decentered the commonsense view of Western 
normalcy, if not superiority. Most importantly, it changed the terrains and trajectories of 
literary and cultural studies forever. 
The enduring legacy of Said’s Orientalism (1978) is the postulation that 
knowledge generation is not an apolitical exercise, just as the Orientalist study in the 
post-Enlightenment Europe was not. He drew on Foucauldian discourse and Gramscian 
hegemony to explain how the study of the Orient proved to be effective and enduring 
because it was “a distribution of geopolitical awareness into aesthetic, scholarly, 
economic, sociological, historical, and philological texts…” (p. 12, emphasis in original). 
Said also asserted that Orientalism was an “enormously systematic discipline by which 
European culture was able to manage—and even produce—the Orient politically, 
sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively during the post-
Enlightenment period” (p. 3). Such production and management was based on how 
identities of the West and the East were discursively constructed as us and them, self and 
other. It is important to note that such dichotomies were undergirded by a value 
assignment. In this imagination, as Said argued, the East was inferior and needed to be 
salvaged by the superior West. 
Said’s interrogation of discursive construction of individual and collective 
identities (e.g., Oriental and Orient), as indicated, has come to be the critical tool for 
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postcolonial studies. What he employed as a tool to dissect colonial discourse of 
subjugation is now used to understand the postcolonial discourse of resistance and 
counter-hegemony. There is, however, the tendency to unduly emphasize the spatiality 
and temporality of postcolonial theory (e.g., Kavoori, 1998). Shome and Hegde (2002) 
argued that the postcolonial scholarship is “committed to theorizing the problematics and 
contexts of de/colonization” but not exclusively focused on “chronicling the facts of 
colonialism” (p. 250). They added that its commitment and critical goals are 
“interventionist and highly political” and thus not limited to theorizing “just colonial 
conditions but why those conditions are what they are, and how they can be undone and 
redone” (p. 250). What such commitment and critical goals enable postcolonial studies to 
do is to widen its scope and coverage to critique disparity of power relations that produce 
and perpetuate the dominant-dominated dichotomy. 
In contemporary times, though, the East-West and North-South divides are not as 
clear as it used to be, for example, during the height of the British colonial enterprise. 
The distinctions have become increasingly “porous under the conditions of globalization” 
(Shome & Hegde, 2002, p. 257). Globalization, as Shome and Hegde reminded us, 
“inevitably heralds a connected world of utopian possibilities—the ultimate dream of 
corporate slogans” but conceals “the realities of deep divisions and inequities of 
exchange” (p. 261). To Rao (2011), understanding globalization requires the 
understanding of “the structure of global power relations which flourishes in the twenty-
first century as an economic, cultural, and political legacy of Western imperialism” 
(pp. 782-783). Murphy (2003) also argued that colonialism has evolved from the physical 
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to the political and mental, and that the globalization of capitalism is “intimately 
connected with colonialism and imperialism” (p. 58). Grossberg (2002) made a similar 
argument that “the contemporary organizations of nations, states, ethnicities, and races 
are the product of a colonial history and its continuing rearticulation in contemporary 
local and international, economic and cultural, relations” (p. 369). Postcolonial theory, 
thus, provides the theoretical and methodological tools to critique globalization.  
However, while postcolonial theory provided different disciplines with the 
conceptual framework and the methodological tool to critique a wide array of issues, its 
influence on and application in communication studies remain somewhat limited. Kumar 
(2014) argued that postcolonial studies and communication studies exist in “a rather 
ambivalent relationship” although both are “centrally concerned with the study of 
language, communication, and culture in specific contexts” (p. 380). Shome and Hegde 
(2002), too, wondered why postcolonial theory has remained largely ignored in 
communication studies although “the politics of postcoloniality is centrally imbricated in 
the politics of communication” (p. 249). Not surprisingly, thus, save a few rare 
exceptions (e.g., Kim & Dutta, 2009; McHale et al., 2007; Waymer & Heath, 2007), 
postcolonial theory has not been used to analyze the role of media discourse during 
crises. 
Surprisingly still, although postcolonial theory is invested in understanding 
discursive (re)production of identity, its deployment in explication of how the media use 
particular linguistic and semantic registers to inform and influence social discourses has 
been rather rare. Most analysis of discursive (re)construction of social phenomena and 
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(re)production of identities of people associated with those phenomena has been done 
using critical discourse analysis as both theoretical framework and methodology.  
For example, Sing (2011) conducted a critical discourse analysis of the Guardian 
news coverage the old vs. new Europe debate, triggered by the “notoriously unforgettable 
words—‘You’re thinking Europe as Germany and France. I don’t. I think that’s old 
Europe—issued in 2003 by the then American Secretary of Defense” (p. 143, emphasis in 
original). Similarly, Mădroane (2012) employed critical discourse analysis of a press 
campaign by a large circulation Romanian broadsheet to explain how it influenced policy 
deliberations on the one hand and “dynamic and strategic construal of collective 
identities” in the Roma, Romanian, and European identity debate on the other (p.103). 
Both these studies have shown how identities are discursively (re)created through 
particular linguistic representations. 
Relevant to crisis communication, Davis and French (2008) employed critical 
discourse analysis, in tandem with social constructionism, to explicate, among other 
things, how the media in their post-Hurricane Katrina coverage used “rhetorical devices, 
semantic strategies, and normalized terminology (e.g., victim and survivor) that 
constructed citizens in a particular way” (p. 248). For example, “recurring references to 
both socioeconomic status and race” were made to “construct a particular identity as the 
‘typical’ victim.” (p. 249). The study showed how the media used language and label to 
project particular identities in respect of the natural disaster. The study also showed how 
critical discourse analysis could be used with other theories for theoretical frameworks 
for such analysis. 
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The ensuing discussion on crisis, media and news framing shows that postcolonial 
theory offers a potent theoretical tool to examine how media organizations selects and 
produces news frames and thus inform and influence crisis discourse, and how their 
political/ideological consciousness/conviction (e.g., neocolonial/imperial, postcolonial) 
(re)shape the discourse and discursively (re)construct a crisis and (re)produce identities 
of individuals that experience it. 
Crisis, Media, and News Framing 
Crisis communication scholars recognize that the media play a crucial role in 
crisis communication — for two reasons in particular. First, the media can and do quickly 
disseminate information to the mass audience during a crisis (Sellnow & Seeger, 2013). 
Typically, people seek information before, during and after a crisis, to assess where they 
are and what they should do (Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2003). For example, when 
Hurricane Katrina ripped through the Gulf Coast of Louisiana and Mississippi in 2005, 
there was a spike in public demand for information, with those in the area of impact 
seeking to find out what evacuation plan the local authorities had in place and how they 
could remain safe while those outside seeking to know the path that the storm would take 
(Littlefield & Quenette, 2007).  
Second, most people learn about crises from the media. Notably, however, as 
Holladay (2012) argued, the media do not extensively cover every crisis although they 
may be significant to the affected communities. Crisis communication scholars strive to 
understand and explain why as a part of their view of the media’s agenda-setting role and 
news framing effects (Sellnow & Seeger, 2013). While agenda-setting underscores 
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positive correlations between the media’s emphasis on certain issues and the audience’s 
attribution of importance to these issues, news framing presupposes that how the media 
portray an issue influences its understanding by the audience (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 
2007). Media scholars continue to argue, though, if the two are the two sides of the same 
coin or if news framing should be subsumed under agenda setting (Tewksbury & 
Scheufele, 2009). It is beyond doubt, however, that how the news media emphasize an 
issue or portray an event significantly influences people’s perception of the issue and the 
event (Entman, 1993). Thus, it is important to understand what factors play into news 
framing. 
Societal norms and values, organizational compulsions and constraints, pressures 
from vested interests, professional routines, and journalists’ political and ideological 
orientations are believed to play significant roles in news selection and production 
(Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2010). Any of these or other factors may translate into 
“systematic bias in media framing of issues, actors, and events” (Entman, 2010, p. 333). 
Hence, it is only expected that different media organizations would characterize the same 
crisis differently (e.g., Tian & Stewart, 2005). Meanwhile, unprecedented advancement 
of information technology in recent years has resulted in a fast globalization of the media 
landscape (Christians, 2005). Critical scholars (e.g., Artz, 2003; Murphy, 2003) argue 
that such media globalization has coincided with the globalization of capitalist economy 
and led to the rise of media monopoly that essentially dictates what is news and what is 
not, and, for example, how news is framed. Needless to say, there often is a stark contrast 
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in how the so-called global, and essentially Western, media frame a crisis compared to 
the local media. 
The very term framing suggests giving prominence to certain elements of reality. 
In terms of news production, it means highlighting particular aspects of an event or an 
issue that promote particular understanding of that event or issue. Entman (1993) 
postulated four functions of frames (i.e., definition of problem, diagnosis of cause, 
passage of moral judgement, and suggestion of remedies). These functions, he argued, 
occur in several locations in the communication process, including the communicator, the 
text, the receiver, and the culture. Appreciation and analysis of news frames, thus, require 
a factoring in of the context wherein the communication is taking place. Context, in other 
words, determines how the framing functions play out (e.g., how the problem is defined, 
the cause is diagnosed). 
De Vreese (2005) drew on Entman’s definition of framing, and posited framing as 
an integrated communicative process that involves “frame-building, frame-setting, and 
individual and societal level consequences of framing” (pp. 51-52). In news production, 
the frame-building stage entails selection of frames and its translation into news items 
while, in the frame-setting stage, interactions between the media frames and the 
audience’s extant understanding and inclination take place. The final stage refers to the 
impact that the media frames have on the individual as well as the society. Frame-
building may entail structural and/or rhetorical processes, with the media including 
certain information and excluding others on the structural level, and/or taking recourse to 
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stereotypes and other culturally-dependent constructs on the rhetorical level (Wiesman, 
2011). 
As indicated earlier, the selection of news frames is a site for conflicts and 
contests, with societal norms and values, vested interests, professional routines weighing 
in along with political and ideological orientations of journalists/media organizations 
(Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2010). D’Angelo and Kuypers (2010) noted that, amidst 
pressure from “politicians, issue advocates, and stakeholders use journalists and other 
news professionals to communicate their preferred meanings of events and issues,” 
journalists often add or superimpose their own frames in the news-making process (p. 1). 
News framing is thus not immune to ideological and political influence and intervention. 
The preceding discussion on news framing and associated institutional and 
individual bias could raise the suspicion that the notion of objectivity in news selection 
and production, especially in the mainstream media, local and global, is ultimately a 
myth. The classical definition of good journalists as individuals serving their society 
through collecting and disseminating information that the members of that society need to 
be free and autonomous (e.g., Elliott & Ozar, 2010; Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2001) may be 
misleading at best and deceptive at worst. As Hartley and Montgomery (1985/2016) 
noted, news is “active in the politics of sense making, even when the stories concern 
matters not usually understood as political…, and even when it is striving for 
impartiality” (p. 260). After all, in the current world order, freedom and autonomy for 
some often entail subjugation for other, and the mainstream media, global and local, often 
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feed, wittingly or unwittingly, the creation and perpetuation of the divide between the 
empowered and the disempowered. 
Research Questions 
The preceding discussion leads to two broader conclusions. First, the managerial, 
post-positivist, and pro-West/U.S. logic and its underlying political/ideological 
assumptions render the dominant crisis communication research and scholarship 
deficient, and thus themselves need to be questioned and contested. Second, such 
questioning and contestation ultimately extends the scope and coverage for crisis 
communication scholarship into examining issues that have so far been largely ignored 
(e.g., how the media organizations contribute to crisis discourse and associated discursive 
(re)construction of crisis and identities of institutions and individuals that experience it). 
These conclusions, in turn, inform the two research questions that guide the present 
study: 
RQ1: What insights about crisis communication emerge in shifting from a 
traditional, functionalist to a postcolonial theoretical framework for analysis? 
RQ2: How do Western and Bangladeshi newspapers support and/or resist a 





Certain broader epistemological assumptions undergird my thesis project. First, 
the media—both local and global—informed and influenced the crisis discourse 
surrounding the Rana Plaza tragedy and, in so doing, discursively (re)constructed the 
crisis and (re)produced the identities (e.g., “victims” and “survivors”) of institutions and 
individuals who experienced it. Second, the media organizations brought their own 
politico-ideological biases and assumptions into such discursive (re)construction of event 
and (re)production of identities. Finally, they employed news framing as a tool for their 
discursive (re)construction of the crisis and (re)production of relevant identities. Based on 
these epistemological assumptions, I set out to analyze the coverage of the Rana Plaza 
tragedy by Western and Bangladeshi English-language newspapers. In the ensuing 
sections, I first describe the sources that I collected my data from and the procedure that I 
followed to collect the data. I also put forth explanations as to why I have chosen these 
sources and not others. I finish the section with a discussion on Critical Discourse 
Analysis, which I will use as the analytical framework for data analysis. 
Data Source 
The Lexis-Nexis Academic database was accessed for reports in the Western and 
Bangladeshi newspapers on the Rana Plaza tragedy. “Rana Plaza,” “Rana Plaza tragedy,” 
and “Rana Plaza disaster” were used as search parameters for reports, features, and 
editorial comments published between April 24, 2013 when the disaster occurred and 
April 24, 2016. The search returned more than 900 entries. Texts from two newspapers 
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each from the United States (i.e., the New York Times and the Washington Post), the 
United Kingdom (i.e., the Guardian and the Telegraph), and Bangladesh (i.e., the 
Financial Express and the New Nation) were selected. The reason for the selection of 
U.S. and British newspapers for the analysis was twofold. First, several retail chains 
operating out of the U.K. and the U.S. (e.g., Children’s Place, Walmart, Cato Fashions, 
Mango) were at the receiving end of the public outrage, both national and international, 
over the Rana Plaza disaster; these companies had outsourced their readymade garment 
products from the factories housed in the ill-fated building. Second, Bangladesh was 
under the British rule for nearly two hundred years from 1757 to 1947, and is very much 
within the arc of the present-day U.S.-led capitalist hegemony. 
The New York Times and the Washington Post were selected from among several 
U.S. newspapers because of their position in the American media industry and place in 
the American media history. The two newspapers are among the oldest, most circulated 
and acclaimed, and most influential news publications in the U.S. The New York Times 
has been in circulation since 1851, sells nearly 1.5 million copies a day, and is the winner 
of 117 Pulitzer Prizes. The Washington Post, on the other hand, has been in circulation 
since 1877, sells nearly half a million copies every day, and is the winner of 47 Pulitzer 
Prizes. Similarly, from among newspapers published in the United Kingdom, the 
Guardian and the Telegraph were selected for analysis because they are among the most 
acclaimed, having won the Newspaper of the Year award several times since the award 
was introduced in 1962, and the most influential. The Guardian, which began publication 
on May 5, 1821 and was known as the Manchester Guardian until 1959, predates the 
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Telegraph, which started circulation on June 1, 1855, by more than three decades. In 
terms of daily circulation, though, the Telegraph is substantially ahead, selling, as of 
December 2016, 460,054 copies compared to the Guardian’s 161,091. However, the 
online edition of the Guardian was the fifth most widely read in the world in 2014, with 
over 42.6 million viewers1. 
The New Nation is one of the oldest English-language newspapers in Bangladesh; 
it began as a daily paper in 1981 after three years of publication as a weekly. It is also the 
first independent English-language daily in the country; the two other English-language 
dailies in circulation at that time were both state-run. In comparison, the Financial 
Express is new; it began publication in 1993. However, it is the first financial English-
language daily in Bangladesh with syndication arrangements with the London-based 
Financial Times and the Prague-based Project Syndicate. It is important to note here that 
English-language newspapers have a very limited readership in Bangladesh. The highest-
circulated English-language daily sells less than a tenth of the number of copies that its 
Bangla-language counterpart sells every day. According to the 2014 government figures, 
the English-language Daily Star2 sold 41,150 copies every day, compared to 553,150 by 
the Bangla-language Bangladesh Protidin (“Bangladesh Protidin Tops Circulation,” 
2014). However, the English-language newspapers have “made a niche among the elite, 
middle class, and decision-makers” and are thus “considerably influential in spite of their 
smaller circulation figures” (Genilo, Asiuzzaman, & Osmani, 2016, p. 130). This 
                                                             
1 Information on the selected British and U.S. newspapers has been sourced from Wikipedia. 
2 The Daily Star was not included in the analysis because there was no report by the newspaper 
on the Lexis-Nexis Academic Database. 
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influence factor informed and influenced my decision to choose Bangladeshi English-
language dailies, and not Bangla-language dailies, for the analysis. 
The Lexis-Nexis Academic Database had more entries for Rana Plaza against the 
two Bangladeshi newspapers (i.e., 179 for the Financial Express and 131 for the New 
Nation) than the four international newspapers selected for the study (i.e., 31 for the New 
York Times, 8 for the Washington Post, 68 for the Guardian, and 16 for the Telegraph). 
Moreover, these entries included duplications and news advisories (i.e., lists of news 
reports and features). Besides, some of these reports and features only made a passing 
reference to Rana Plaza. For example, the New York Times piece dated August 27, 2015 
on a Bangladesh court’s embargo on the release of a documentary film on the industrial 
disaster was not included in the analysis as it focuses exclusively on the court’s ruling 
and its implications. Similarly, the Financial Express report dated April 23, 2015 on the 
Human Rights Watch recommendations for improvement in working condition across 
Bangladesh’s readymade garment industry was excluded because it deals primarily with 
the 78-page document released by the New York-based human rights watchdog. 
Furthermore, some more reports and features were excluded from the analysis because 
they primarily dealt with the daily updates on the rescue operations, and casualty figures. 
For example, the New Nation report dated April 25, 2013 was not selected because it 
essentially tallies the number of bodies recovered and of people rescued from the rubbles 
on the day that the building collapsed. These reports were thought to be of limited 
relevance insofar as the purpose of the thesis is concerned (i.e., how local and 
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international media discursively (re)constructed the Rana Plaza tragedy and the identities 
of individuals and institutions that had experienced the crisis). 
In the end, 20 items were selected from the New York Times, 6 from the 
Washington Post, 23 from the Guardian, 4 from the Telegraph. These news reports, 
features, and editorial comments reasonably represented the trajectory of news coverage 
of the Rana Plaza disaster and its aftermath by the international media organizations. As 
can be understood from these texts, these newspapers pivoted to the issue of financial 
compensation for the dead and the wounded within a couple of months of the disaster. 
This shift in focus, as I argue in the results section, contributed significantly to the 
discursive (re)construction of the disaster itself and of the identities of the institutions and 
individuals who experienced it.  
The texts selected from the selected British and U.S. newspapers were used to 
develop a timeline, which subsequently provided the matrix for selecting reports, 
features, and editorial comments from the two Bangladeshi newspapers. To illustrate, one 
of the New York Times reports is dated April 26, 2013 and, thus, the reports published in 
the Financial Express and the New Nation on the same date were selected for analysis. In 
cases where there were multiple reports in the Bangladeshi newspapers on a particular 
date, those with similar focus or emphasis vis-à-vis the British and/or U.S. newspapers 
were selected for analysis. For example, on April 26, 2013, the Financial Express 
published two pieces on the Rana Plaza disaster and the New Nation four but only the 
Financial Express items were analyzed because the focus/emphasis was similar to that 
the New York Times report of the same date. Moreover, if the two Bangladeshi 
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newspapers carried reports on the same incident/development, one of them was selected 
for analysis. For example, both the Financial Express and the New Nation reported the 
arrest of the Rana Plaza owner five days after the building collapsed but the Financial 
Express report was selected for analysis because there was no significant difference in the 
content and emphasis of the reports. In the end, 26 reports from the Financial Express and 
23 from the New Nation were analyzed. Overall, thus, 102 reports, features and editorial 
comments were analyzed for the study (see Appendix A and B). 
Data Analysis 
My thesis project examined how the local and global media organizations 
discursively framed the crisis surrounding the Rana Plaza disaster and, in the process, 
contributed to the (re)production of identities of individuals and institutions that 
experienced the crisis. Such an examination essentially presupposes that the meaning of 
any media text is assigned, not innate, and dynamic, not static, warranting an 
understanding of not just the text and textual structure in news coverage but also its 
socio-politico-cultural context (Meadows, 2014). As van Dijk (1988) noted, a news 
analysis could only be socially, politically, and ideologically relevant insofar as it made 
“explicit implied or indirect meanings of functions of news reports: What is not said may 
even be more important, from a critical point of view, than what is explicitly said or 
meant” (p. 17). The emphasis of the analysis was, thus, not on determining how many 
times a term or a phrase appeared in a news item (i.e., quantitative content analysis) but 
rather on how it was used to create meaning (i.e., qualitative discourse analysis). 
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Moreover, implicit in the central assumption of my thesis project is the 
understanding that media organizations bring their own political and ideological biases 
into their coverage of incidents and issues, and often give precedence to one particular 
discourse over others. Given such a critical edge to the project, I have chosen to employ 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as the primary analytical tool. CDA aims to 
“investigate critically social inequality as it is expressed, signaled, constituted, 
legitimized and so on by language use (or in discourse)” (Wodak, 2001, p. 2), is premised 
on the assumption that “all discourses are historical and can therefore only be understood 
with reference to their context” (Meyer, 2001, p. 15), and theorizes “discourse as a 
moment of social practices” (Fairclough, 2001, p. 122). The description of discourse as 
social practice, according to Fairclough and Wodak (1997), “implies a dialectical 
relationship between a particular discursive event and the situation(s), the institution(s) 
and social structure(s) which frame it” (p. 258); discourse is not just shaped by but also 
shapes situations, institutions, and social structures. What it means, among others, is that 
discourse “constitutes… social identities of and relationships between people and groups 
of people” (p. 258). As such, CDA is frequently employed to examine and explicate how 
identity, especially collective identity, are discursively formed and negotiated (e.g., 
Richardson & Langford, 2015). CDA also views the mass media “as a site of power and 
social struggle, as well as a site where language is often only apparently transparent” 
(Wodak & Busch, 2004, p. 110). Several studies have shown the mass media to be active 
participant in discursive construction and negotiation of collective identities (e.g., 
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Mădroane 2012). Overall, the theoretical position, proposition, and preoccupation of 
CDA is consistent with the critical and postcolonial traditions that frame my project.  
In view of the ongoing debate as to whether CDA is a theory or a method or both, 
questions may arise if it could or should be employed as a methodological tool to 
complement a theoretical perspective. CDA has been used exclusively as a methodology 
(Mădroane, 2012), as both a theoretical perspective and a methodological tool (e.g., 
Alexander, 2013; Cheregi, 2015; Richardson & Langford, 2015) as well as in 
combination with other methodologies as an analytical tool (e.g., Sing, 2011). Thus, 
when Van Dijk (2001) argued that CDA is “not a method, nor a theory that simply can be 
applied to social problems” (p. 96), it could have been an affirmation of CDA’s 
ontological fluidity as well as flexibility. 
It is also important to note that there is not a single methodological model of CDA 
to follow. Van Dijk (1993) noted that certain persuasive moves (i.e., argumentation, 
rhetorical figures, lexical style, quoting credible witnesses) are used to enhance a 
particular discourse and, at the same time, undermine others. The discourse analytical 
study of the selected text for my thesis project was limited to examining and explicating 
how these persuasive moves were used as discursive strategies. To this end, the selected 
texts were closely read, which led to the identification of several common points of 
emphases such as the cause of the disaster, the need for the readymade garment industry 
to recover, and redress for those affected by the disaster. However, surrounding these 
points of emphases, the local and global media organizations presented and persisted with 
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different and sometimes contradictory discourses through employment of the persuasive 
moves discussed above. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have described how the data for my thesis project was collected. 
I have stated the rationale for the selection of the Guardian and the Telegraph from the 
United Kingdom, New York Times and the Washington Post from the United States, and 
the Financial Express and the New Nation from Bangladesh as sources of data. I have 
also explained the process undertaken to put together the 102 items from these 
newspapers, including reports, features, and editorial comments. Furthermore, I have 
offered a rationale why I conducted a qualitative textual analysis, not quantitative content 
analysis, for the study. Finally, I have reasoned why I chose CDA as the analytical tool, 
explaining how its theoretical position, proposition, and preoccupation are consistent with 
the critical and postcolonial bent of for my thesis project. In the next chapter, I present 





For this project, I conducted a qualitative textual analysis of 102 news reports, 
features, and editorial comments on the Rana Plaza collapse from six English-language 
news dailies—two each from the United Kingdom, the United States, and Bangladesh. 
The analysis was aimed at identifying if and how the Bangladeshi newspapers differed 
with their counterparts in the U.K. and the U.S. in the discursive creation and negotiation 
of identities of individuals and institutions that experienced—directly and indirectly—the 
crisis in the aftermath of the collapse of the multistoried building, which killed more than 
1,100 people and wounded over 2,000 others. Several common points of emphasis related 
to the Rana Plaza incident emerged upon a close reading of the texts from the six 
newspapers. These included the cause[s] of the collapse, its impact[s] on the industry and 
individuals, and the redress, financial and otherwise, for the dead and the wounded. 
However, these common points of emphasis did not produce one overarching discourse 
that one might expect. In fact, there appeared to be two discernible discourses 
surrounding the Rana Plaza crisis, one advanced and maintained by the Western and the 
other by the Bangladeshi newspapers. The identities thus created and negotiated were 
different, too. The analysis also revealed that the difference in the two discourses was 
directly linked to how the Western and Bangladeshi newspapers framed the collapse of 
the Rana Plaza. In sum, the discursive creation of identities of individuals and institutions 
that experienced the Rana Plaza crisis was consequent upon and/or occasioned by the 
news framing of the Rana Plaza collapse. 
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This chapter is divided into five sections. The first section deals with how the 
Western newspapers framed the collapse of the Rana Plaza, and how their framing was 
different from that by the Bangladeshi newspapers. In the second section, I describe how 
these newspapers framed the Bangladesh garment industry (in particular) and Bangladesh 
(in general) and how such framing is consistent with their discourse on the Rana Plaza 
collapse. In the third section, I discuss how the Western media approached the 
compensation issue and how its approach differed from that of the local newspapers. The 
fourth section traces how the Western media portrays the factory safety initiatives by 
European and U.S. factories. The fifth and final section depicts the two sets of identities 
that emerged from the discourses advanced by the Western and Bangladeshi newspapers, 
and illustrates the connections between the discursive dynamics described and discussed 
in the preceding sections. 
Accident vs. Murder: Framing the Rana Plaza Collapse 
Within a week of the collapse, it became clear that the number of fatalities would 
be in several hundreds and could even exceed the 1,000-mark. As the death toll climbed, 
there were numerous reports in the national and international media on what had caused 
the collapse and how it could have been averted. The British and U.S. newspapers 
generally framed the incident as somewhat inevitable. The New York Times wrote on 
April 26, 2013: 
 
What is increasingly clear is that the collapse should not have been a surprise. 
Factory fires have killed hundreds of garment workers in the past decade. At the 
same time, many factory buildings are substandard and unsafe. 
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It was a reference to the frequent occurrence of industrial accidents and the grim record 
of factory safety in Bangladesh, especially in the readymade garment industry. The 
Guardian, on the other hand, blamed it on systemic dysfunctionality in its April 29, 2013 
report:  
 
Rana’s [owner of the building] dramatic capture raises a broader question: 
whether Wednesday's disaster was all the fault of one man, or, as some suggest, 
was the product of Bangladesh’s dysfunctional system, where politics and 
business are closely connected, corruption is rife, and the gap between rich and 
poor continues to grow. 
 
The British daily traced the cause of the collapse back to the dysfunctionality of 
Bangladesh’s socio-politico-economic system. The government inquiry report, which was 
released on May 22, just about a month after the collapse of the Rana Plaza, drew similar 
conclusions. The New York Times summarized the inquiry findings in one short 
paragraph of its May 23, 2013 report: 
 
Rana Plaza was a disaster waiting to happen, the government report suggested. 
Mr. Rana illegally constructed upper floors to house garment factories employing 
several thousand workers, it said. Large power generators placed on these upper 
floors, necessary because of regular power failures, would shake the poorly 
constructed building whenever they were switched on, according to the report. 
 
The inquiry report clearly bolstered the British and U.S. newspapers’ perspective on the 
Rana Plaza collapse that it was neither unprecedented nor isolated and might have been 
inevitable. 
The Bangladeshi newspapers were also aware of the systemic dysfunctionality 
that had contributed to the Rana Plaza disaster. The New Nation reported on April 25, 
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2013 that the owner had not secured approval from the capital city development 
authorities, known as Rajuk after its Bangla acronym, for the building but gone ahead 
with its construction, making most of the existence of two contradictory laws: 
 
One such law said a person who want [sic] to construct a building at Savar before 
2008 was not required to take Rajuk permission, since it is not located in the city 
area. Another law said it is mandatory to take such permission. There is a total 
chaos and dishonest people have taken advantage of it. 
 
It was even more critical in a subsequent editorial comment, published on April 27, 2013: 
 
The building cracked one day earlier, but no authority showed any concern about 
protecting the lives of few thousand garment workers. The government has 
become so unaccountable to the people that nobody in the government takes 
people [sic] lives seriously. The truth is, the country is in the grip of greedy 
incompetent persons who are busy serving self-interest. The success of the 
government will be best judge [sic] how many of them have been able to amass 
how much wealth. 
 
The Financial Express was equally scathing in its April 26, 2013 editorial comment: 
 
Tragedies starting from Tazreen Garments to Rana Plaza tell the same story. One 
need not have to abide by the rules of the country; things are disposed off [sic] by 
the ‘grace’ of almost ‘almighty’ money and political power. Look at Tazreen. 
Was the owner arrested for violation of laws? Will the owners, both of the 
building and factories, be arrested for the ‘murder’ they allegedly committed on 
Wednesday? The answer is probably a big ‘No.’ 
 
Clearly, the Bangladeshi newspapers acknowledged the underlying systemic failures but, 
unlike their Western counterparts, insisted that the responsibility rested on 
individuals/institutions that had exploited these failures to their benefit, economic and 
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otherwise. In other words, factory buildings did not just happen to be unsafe; deliberate 
use of substandard materials by the owners rendered these structures unsafe.  
The use of the term murder in the Financial Express editorial comment is also 
instructive in that it emphasized the Bangladeshi newspaper’s view on the collapse of the 
Rana Plaza — that it was the fallout of a series of devious and deviant acts by the owner 
of the building, the owners of the factories housed therein, and people in power who had 
overlooked their deviance and deviousness. Simply put, the Bangladeshi newspapers 
framed the Rana Plaza as a criminal act that warranted retributive measures. Hence, much 
of their Rana Plaza-related reports was concerned with the public demand for, and 
progress in, the law enforcement, legal and judicial processes surrounding the collapse of 
the building. For example, between April 28 and May 15, 2013, the New Nation carried 
reports with headlines such as “Voice for justice gets louder,” “Rana placed on 15-day 
remand,” “Arrest local MP Murad Jong,” “Rana Plaza engineer held,” “Savar Poura 
[Municipal] Mayor suspended,” and “Victims’ families for capital punishment to Sohel 
Rana.” 
On the contrary, the British and U.S. newspapers chose to frame the Rana Plaza 
collapse as an accident/tragedy that was beyond anyone’s control and thus incriminated 
no individual or institution in particular. Such a framing warranted emphasis on assistive 
measures such as monetary compensation and preventive measures such as factory 
inspections and factory safety improvements. Intriguingly, the New York Times on April 
27, 2013 quoted the Bangladesh information as saying: “I wouldn’t call it an accident… 
[but] a murder.” Clearly, just as its Bangladeshi counterparts, the U.S. newspaper, too, 
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had the option of framing the Rana Plaza incident as an act of crime occasioned by 
deliberate (in)actions by certain individuals and institutions but chose not to. 
Subsequently, the New York Times and other Western newspapers also chose not to 
persist with questions that they had raised earlier in their coverage of the Rana Plaza 
crisis, questions that pointed to not just moral but, perhaps, also legal responsibility of the 
Western companies and institutions. 
In its report published on April 26, 2013, the New York Times quoted a University 
of California, Berkeley professor as saying: 
 
Even in a situation of grave threat, when they saw cracks in the walls, factory 
managers thought it was too risky not to work because of the pressure on them 
from U.S. and European retailers to deliver their goods on time. 
 
He also suggested that “these factories are cutting corners on fire safety and building 
safety” because Western companies pay low prices for their products. In a similar vein, 
the Guardian reported on April 26, 2013: “The tragedy has focused attention on the low 
wages paid to Bangladeshi staff, whose cut-price labour allows shops in the west to clock 
up large profits.” The New York Times also mentioned that three of the factories housed 
in the Rana Plaza were given clearance by well-known Western factory monitoring 
groups. It reported on April 27, 2013: 
 
A leading factory monitoring group, the Business Social Compliance Initiative, 
which is based in Brussels, said that two of the factories in the building — New 
Waves Style and Phantom Apparel — were inspected and had complied with the 
group’s code of conduct. Another factory in the building, Ether Tex, said on its 
website that it had passed an inspection by a monitoring group in Düsseldorf, 
Germany, the Service Organization for Compliance Audit Management. The 
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website said Ether Tex was being evaluated by the Business Social Compliance 
Initiative. 
 
The report added though that these groups focused on if factories had smoke detectors or 
whether they keep their exit doors locked, and that they left building structure or fire 
escapes for the government inspectors to assess. Nonetheless, these explanations could 
appear as mere excuses and the inspection by these groups, thus, as mere ethical 
whitewash, which, apparently, the Western newspapers did not want to be part of the 
discourse that they were advancing or maintaining. These incriminatory instances would 
surely have come to the fore had they chosen to frame the Rana Plaza collapse as the 
fallout of deliberate, and thus criminal, negligence. Such a framing would then have 
implicated not just the owners of the building and the factories housed therein but also 
the Western companies who outsourced their products to these factories at very low 
prices. That was apparently never the intent. In fact, as I argue later, the discourse that the 
Western newspapers advanced/maintained required the Western companies to be placed 
on a high pedestal — moral and otherwise.  
In sum, a murder/crime frame, which Bangladeshi newspapers generally pursued, 
would have made Western companies vulnerable to be implicated, morally and perhaps 
legally, for the Rana Plaza collapse and the concomitant loss of life and limb. On the 
other hand, an accident/tragedy frame, which the Western newspapers espoused, made 
these connections less obvious and allowed the Western companies to be projected as the 
good Samaritans. To this end, the Western newspapers also cast Bangladesh in poor light, 
which I discuss in the next section. 
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Poor and Primitive, Inept and Inefficient:  
Diagnosing Bangladesh as Cause 
Governmental ineptitudes and governance failures in Bangladesh constituted a 
common theme in much of post-Rana Plaza collapse reports, features, and editorial 
comments by the U.K. and U.S. newspapers. From the beginning, these newspapers 
sought to blame the Rana Plaza disaster on what they characterized as the country’s 
systemic dysfunctionality. Governmental ineptitudes and governance failures, they 
implied, made the Rana Plaza incident and the like in Bangladesh hardly surprising. The 
Guardian reported on June 4, 2013 that a survey by Bangladeshi engineers had found 60 
per cent of the garment industry buildings at risk of collapse. The British daily pointed 
out though that the survey had only covered “a sixth of 600 buildings that house more 
than 3,000 clothes factories” and quoted the survey team leader as saying that “there may 
be lots of very vulnerable (factories) we don’t know about” but they “did not want to 
create panic so we are saying they can run for the moment.” A day earlier, the New York 
Times reported: 
 
Inspecting Bangladesh’s garment factories is an acutely complicated task. No 
government agency is certain of precisely how many such factories operate in 
Bangladesh, or where they are. Some inspectors are discovering that building 
plans filed with government agencies do not always match the actual buildings. 
Many factories built during the 1980s and 1990s have no architectural drawings at 
all. 
 
In the wake of the Rana Plaza collapse, there was a surge in factory inspections, with the 
Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association, a platform for apparel 
factory owners, recruited 10 engineers for inspections. However, 
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… the inspection process quickly took on an ad hoc quality. One factory 
executive complained of submitting to inspections from five different entities. 
Most factories have not yet been inspected at all. Some brands have sent their 
own inspection teams, including Tesco, the British retailer, which stopped placing 
orders at one local garment maker, Liberty Fashions, after the chain’s inspectors 
found structural problems in the factory — a finding angrily disputed by the 
factory’s Bangladeshi owner. 
 
On June 6, 2013, the Guardian reported a British government minister’s visit to the 
Center for the Rehabilitation of the Paralyzed, a specialized medical facility funded by 
Britain’s Department for International Development. The minister for international 
development commented: “Bangladesh lacks the capacity to police employment rights, 
health and safety measures, and building standards. The result is a tragedy like Rana 
Plaza.” His assessment fit perfectly into the discourse the British and U.S. newspapers 
apparently preferred—that systemic deficiency and dysfunctionality in Bangladesh had 
made the Rana Plaza collapse an inevitability. Such a discourse preempted any possibility 
of implicating the moral, if not legal, responsibility of the Western companies that 
essentially exploited the systemic deficiency and dysfunctionality for their profit margins. 
Moreover, these newspapers suggested, Bangladesh was incapable of not just 
preventing a crisis of this magnitude but also handling post-crisis exigencies. Besides, 
they indicated, the country did not have the capacity to even appreciate the assistance 
afforded to it by the Western countries and companies at different times. The Telegraph, 
for example, reported on May 1, 2003:  
 
Bangladesh discarded hi-tech search equipment that could have saved people 
trapped in the Dhaka building collapse. Thermal imaging and telescopic search 
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cameras were given to Bangladesh in a UN aid package for disaster management 
partly funded with £18million from Britain’s Department for International 
Development. 
 
The newspaper quoted the UN’s humanitarian affairs adviser as rebutting the Bangladesh 
fire service training director’s assessment that the search equipment was not appropriate 
for the conditions and lamenting that more lives could have been saved if the equipment 
had been “correctly used.” It also quoted the project manager of the UN disaster 
management project as suggesting that senior officers who had been trained how to use 
the equipment did not pass on the knowledge to rescue workers at the Rana Plaza site. 
The report ends with the UN disaster management official saying: “This is Bangladesh.” 
It is noteworthy how the British daily pitches the opinions of two UN officials against 
that of a Bangladesh fire service official, who apparently was more in touch with the 
reality on the ground. The use of the UN official’s suggestive comment to end the report 
is also noteworthy in that the statement was used as a kind of authoritative endorsement 
of the newspaper’s damning indictment of Bangladesh’s disaster management capability. 
Inadequacy of key facilities related to post-crisis exigencies was also the theme in 
the May 31, 2013 report published in the New York Times. The report focused on the 
struggle that Bangladesh’s only DNA laboratory was in, trying to identify the Rana Plaza 
dead whose bodies were disfigured and/or decomposed beyond recognition. The U.S. 
daily reported:  
 
Founded in 2006 with a grant from the Danish Embassy, the lab is now 
overwhelmed. Completing the DNA profiles could take months. New machines 
are needed to decalcify the bone samples. Approval is still pending for expensive 
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software capable of sorting through the tens of thousands of possible DNA 
matches. 
 
The report provides a detailed account of the personnel and logistics constraints that the 
lab had to work under, not to speak of the pressure for expeditious identification of the 
dead amidst allegation that the government was trying to save on compensation money 
by concealing the actual fatality figures. The U.S. daily quoted the operations manager at 
the lab as saying: “To handle normal situations, the lab is O.K. But now a whole year’s 
caseload has come up, all of a sudden.” While the quote indicated the gravity of the 
situation, the newspaper was more interested to use the lab as a representative case of 
institutional and infrastructural inadequacy in Bangladesh. Hence, it wrote: 
 
From the moment Rana Plaza collapsed, the scale of the disaster outstripped the 
capacities of the Bangladeshi government. In the initial days, as dozens of bodies 
were being pulled hourly from the wreckage, a nearby high school served as a 
staging area for thousands of people looking for missing relatives or just gawking. 
Bodies were placed in plank coffins and sprayed with disinfectant as lines of 
people walked slowly past. 
 
The suggestion seems to be that the government failed to protect not the just the lives but 
also the identities of many killed in the Rana Plaza collapse because of inefficiency and 
ineptitude of personnel, and inadequacy of infrastructure. 
The predicament was grave for the survivors of the Rana Plaza collapse as well as 
the rescue workers who pulled out people from the debris, dead or alive, according to the 
Western media. The Washington Post reported on September 8, 2013 about the acute 
shortage of trained mental health professionals in Bangladesh to help the survivors and 
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rescue workers cope with the psychological trauma that they had been exposed to. It 
wrote: 
Nearly five months after the deadliest incident in garment manufacturing history, 
the suffering is far from over for the victims, their relatives and the rescue 
workers… activists and health-care professionals decry a lack of psychological 
and financial support for scores of survivors and rescue workers stricken with 
invisible handicaps. 
 
To illustrate their predicament, the newspaper focused on the Center for the 
Rehabilitation of the Paralyzed. The center  
 
… has worked beyond its capacity to care for Rana Plaza’s injured. But because 
of a dearth of trained mental health professionals, patients with symptoms of 
acute psychological trauma receive “a minimum” of counseling before they are 
discharged, said Hossain Mehedi, a doctor at the center. 
 
It is notable that the institutions and initiatives in Bangladesh that were cast in positive 
and sympathetic light by the British and U.S. newspapers were either funded or founded 
by one Western country or the other. The underlying message apparently is that whatever 
good there is in Bangladesh owes its existence to the West somehow.  
In contrast, the public-sector institutions and initiatives were often either 
downplayed or denigrated. The law enforcement and judicial failures were especially 
highlighted. For example, the New York Times reported on May 3, 2013 the arrest of the 
engineer who had warned that the Rana Plaza was unsafe a day before it collapsed. The 
newspaper wrote: 
 
The arrest of the engineer, Abdur Razzaque Khan, was a surprise twist since he 
was regarded as something of a hero for trying to avert the April 24 disaster. A 
day before the building collapsed, Mr. Khan had been summoned because cracks 
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had suddenly appeared in the structure, forcing an evacuation. He concluded that 
the building had become dangerous and should be closed until experts could 
conduct a more thorough investigation — advice that turned out to be grimly 
prescient. 
 
Apparently, the arrest was made after the owner of the Rana Plaza as well as the owners 
of the readymade garment factories situated therein had told the police, during 
interrogation, that the engineer had told them that the cracks were not serious. Notably, 
the U.S. newspaper had two days earlier depicted the owner of the Rana Plaza as “the 
most hated Bangladeshi.” It wrote on May 1, 2013: 
 
And perhaps no one wielded power more brazenly than Sohel Rana. He traveled 
by motorcycle, as untouchable as a mafia don, trailed by his own biker gang. 
Local officials and the Bangladeshi news media say he was involved in illegal 
drugs and guns, but he also had a building, Rana Plaza, that housed five factories. 
Upstairs, workers earned as little as $40 a month making clothes for retailers like 
J. C. Penney. Downstairs, Mr. Rana hosted local politicians, playing pool, 
drinking and, the officials say, indulging in drugs. 
 
Yet, the suggestion seems to be, the law enforcement and investigation authorities banked 
on the words of a villain to arrest a hero, whose words, if heeded to, could have averted 
the death and injury to so many thousands. Implicit in this narrative seemed to be yet 
another damning indictment — that such a system can hardly deliver justice. 
Subsequently, the New York Times reported on June 30, 2013 the delay in a case 
against Delwar Hossain, the owner of Tazreen Fashions, which caught fire in November 
2012 because of what the government investigation concluded as gross fire safety 
violations and negligence. The fire killed 112 workers “who were making clothes for 
retailers like Walmart and Sears.” The newspaper wrote: 
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The more pertinent question might be this: In Bangladesh, where the garment 
industry powers the economy and wields enormous political clout, is it possible to 
hold factory owners like Mr. Hossain accountable? 
 
The question was pertinent because  
 
Many garment factory owners are now entrenched in the nation's power elite, 
some as members of Parliament. Garments represent 80 percent of the country's 
manufacturing exports, giving the industry vast economic power, while factory 
owners also finance campaigns during national elections, giving them broad 
political influence. 
 
Moreover, the New York Times added: 
 
Bangladesh’s legal system has rarely favored anyone confronting the power 
structure. Much of the legal code has remained intact since the British imperial 
era, when laws were devised to control the population and protect the colonialist 
power structure. 
 
Hence, it continued: 
 
Bangladeshi factories have always suffered fires and accidents, usually without 
attracting international attention. One study estimated that more than 1,000 
workers died in hundreds of factory fires or accidents from 1990 to 2012. Not 
once was a factory owner charged with any crime, activists say. 
 
Read together, these two reports in the New York Times suggest that the legal and judicial 
systems are rigged in favor of the moneyed and the politically powerful, and that justice 
in the Rana Plaza cases would remain elusive as that in the Tazreen Fashions case. Such 
an undermining of any prospect for justice foregrounded compensation as a more viable 
option for redress. Foregrounding compensation also meant that the Western companies 
could be discursively afforded an elevated position. As will be shown in the next section, 
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the British and U.S. newspapers reported the compensation in a way that make the 
Western companies appear as the good Samaritans, contributing to the compensation 
fund out of moral obligation, not out of any sense of guilt or remorse and/or real guilt or 
remorse. 
The Compensation Deal and the Good Samaritans 
The British and U.S. newspapers never really framed the Rana Plaza collapse as a 
fallout of the Western retail chains’ relentless pressure on apparel manufacturers to keep 
the prices low, which, according to a workplace monitoring expert quoted in the New 
York Times, forced the latter into “cutting corners on fire safety and building safety.” 
Rather, they castigated these companies for not living up to, as the U.S. publication 
reported on April 26, 2013, a promise that they had made in the wake of the November 
2012 fire at Tazreen Fashions, “to take steps to ensure the safety of Bangladeshi factories 
that make the goods the companies sell.” The Rana Plaza collapse, wrote the Washington 
Post on October 24, 2014, exposed “earlier safety programs touted by Western retailers” 
as “an ineffective and ultimately self-defeating ethical whitewash.” It was implicit in 
their narrative that the Rana Plaza collapse with its staggering death toll was exclusively 
the outcome of governmental ineptitudes and governance failures in Bangladesh and that 
in no way should the Western companies be implicated, even morally, for the criminal 
negligence surrounding the disaster. The New York Times carried a report on May 17, 
2013 about two separate letters sent to the U.S. retailers, requesting them to “act together 
to force changes in overseas workplace.” One of the letters, signed by religious groups 
and investors, said: 
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They [Tazreen Fashions fire and Rana Plaza collapse] are a grave indictment of 
the human rights record of Bangladesh, and illustration of the failure of the global 
companies that manufacture and sources their products there to ensure humane 
working conditions.  
 
These lines aptly reflect the distinction that the Western media narrative made between 
criminal responsibility for the Rana Plaza disaster, which befell Bangladesh and 
Bangladesh alone, and humanitarian responsibility for its victims, which the Western 
companies chose to bear in the form of the global compensation fund. Thus, New York 
Times on March 29, 2014 quoted a Gap spokesperson reminding everyone that the 
company was “never linked to production at Rana Plaza” but contributed to the fund 
anyway because it wanted “to see lasting change occur in Bangladesh.” The Guardian 
similarly reported on March 28, 2014: 
 
Asda and Gap have not been linked to Rana Plaza, but have chosen to make 
donations alongside Walmart and The Children’s Place. The four retailers and 
other unnamed companies have paid more than $5m to a humanitarian fund 
operated by BRAC, a Bangladeshi anti-poverty organisation. It, in turn, is paying 
$2.2m to the ILO-backed compensation fund and using the rest of the money for 
counselling and rehabilitation for garment workers involved in the Rana Plaza 
incident and for a “social safety net” for those affected by other workplace 
disasters such as the Tazreen factory fire of 2012. 
 
Again, in reporting Primark’s donation of ₤1 million in short-term aid for Rana Plaza 
victims, the British daily quoted on June 8, 2013 a senior official at Associated British 
Foods, which owns the British retail chain, as saying: “It is the right thing to do.” Thus, 
the contribution by the Western companies to the compensation fund came to be 
projected as a moral act, not an admission of guilt. 
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At the same time, the compensation fund was itself trumpeted as a breakthrough, 
a landmark. The New York Times reported on December 24, 2013:  
 
The new fund is considered a landmark in compensating families of garment 
industry victims, in terms of both the amount to be paid and the sophistication of 
the arrangements… the families of the dead would receive, on average, more than 
$25,000 each, while hundreds of workers who were injured or maimed would also 
receive compensation. Per capita income in Bangladesh is about $1,900 a year. 
 
The newspaper quoted the international coordinator of the Clean Clothes Campaign, a 
European anti-sweatshop group, as saying:  
 
We think the agreement is a really good result. The agreement will deliver to all 
the victims and the families of the Rana Plaza disaster full and fair compensation 
in a credible manner. 
 
The daily also included a quote from the program director of an International Labor 
Organization affiliate that glorified the compensation initiative at the expense of 
Bangladesh’s reputation: “If you look at the history of compensation efforts in the 
Bangladesh garment industry, it’s not a good one. But this is a potential breakthrough.” 
An earlier New York Times report dated May 31, 2013 made a similar suggestion, noting: 
 
[Bangladesh] Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has announced a compensation 
package for families of those killed at Rana Plaza that could exceed $12,000, with 
the money coming from public and private sources… Yet so far, only 150 
families have received the first installment of about $1,100… 
 
In fact, the Western newspapers tended to highlight Bangladesh’s poor record in a 
particular area whenever they introduced a Western initiative relevant to the area.  
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Bangladesh was not always the only one at the receiving end of criticism, though. 
Surrounding the compensation fund, the Guardian hardly missed an opportunity to 
highlight the fact that Primark, a British retailer, was the first Western company to 
commit and disburse compensation money for the dead and the wounded in the Rana 
Plaza collapse. It reported on June 8, 2013: 
 
After previous factory disasters, victims and their families have waited up to two 
years for compensation. Primark, whose supplier employed less than 10% of the 
Rana Plaza workforce, has pledged compensation to all victims. The company, 
with the help of a local non-governmental organisation, has set up bank accounts 
for victims to avoid money being siphoned off by unscrupulous middlemen. 
 
In fact, the British daily frequently ran updates on Primark’s compensation initiative 
while covering the initial refusal by Walmart and other U.S. retailers to contribute to the 
fund. When the Walmart eventually donated to the fund, it quoted on March 28, 2014, the 
general secretary of an international trade union as criticizing the contribution as “paltry.” 
The newspaper did not forget to contrast Walmart’s contribution with Primark’s, either:  
 
The sums are dwarfed by the efforts of the British retailer Primark, which has 
paid $1m into the ILO-backed fund and is giving $9m in formal compensation 
approved by the ILO to 580 people working for its supplier New Wave Bottoms, 
which was on the second floor of Rana Plaza. 
 
Moreover, when the compensation fund reached its $30 million target, the British daily 
again singled out the U.S. retail chain as an example of why the fund took more than two 
years and a substantial downward revision of $10 million to meet its target: “Walmart, 
the world’s largest retailer with net sales of $482.2bn, donated an estimated $1m.” It was 
as if the newspaper was on a mission to prove that the European companies in general 
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and the British companies in particular, and even companies based in Canada, were more 
conscientious and morally responsive than their U.S. counterparts. Most importantly, it 
reflected the Western newspapers’ general preoccupation with the Western retailers in 
respect of the compensation fund rather than how the delay in the fund’s meeting the 
target affected the family of the dead and the wounded in the Rana Plaza disaster, on 
which the Bangladeshi newspapers reported regularly. 
Whenever the Financial Express or the New Nation reported on compensation for 
the dead and the wounded in the Rana Plaza disaster, be it arranged or disbursed by the 
Bangladesh government or the International Labor Organization or somebody else, the 
report generally described the victims’ ordeal in the absence of such assistance. For 
example, the Financial Express reported on October 24, 2013 about the predicament of a 
young woman who worked on the third floor of Rana Plaza and survived its collapse. She 
was quoted as saying:  
 
I am lucky to survive while my brother is still missing… I have to look after the 
two kids of my brother… I got the Primark payment but I am scared thinking 
about the future when there would be no penny in my hand… how can I feed 
those kids? 
 
Again, on April 17, 2014, the Bangladeshi daily quoted a 15-year-old girl who worked on 
the second floor of the ill-fated building as saying: “I am totally in the dark about my 
future. I am unable to work and even can’t move easily.” The New Nation, on the other 
hand, reported on April 22, 2014 the anti-corruption watchdog Transparency 
International Bangladesh’s allegation of lack of transparency in the disbursement of 
compensation payment and its recommendation for a “‘Garment Sector Governance 
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Authority’ to ensure transparency and accountability during implementation of different 
initiatives and pledges by the government in the apparel sector.”  
Moreover, albeit not so explicitly, the Financial Express questioned how the 
global fund calculated the compensation package for the dead and the wounded. The 
newspaper reported on May 15, 2013: 
 
It is based on 500,000 taka [approximately $6,200] for pain and sufferings per 
worker, and loss of income, based on an average salary of 5,833 taka 
[approximately $72] per month (which includes two months bonus per year) for 
10 years (injured workers) and 25 years (deceased workers). 
 
It also mentioned that the same calculation was used in case of previous factory accidents 
that took place in 2012–13. In contrast, when reporting on the individual compensation 
package, the Western newspapers provided the total figure of $25,000 without any 
detailed breakdown. A detailed breakdown would have shown, as the Financial Express 
report did, the average wage factored into the compensation was not significantly more 
than the “cut-price labor” that these papers consistently decried. Yet, the Western 
newspapers portrayed the compensation plan as a landmark. The New York Times on 
February 24, 2014 quoted an International Labor Organization representative as saying: 
 
The significance of this is we have a mechanism that the whole industry can 
support. We haven’t been able to say that before. What we had before was the 
blame game. 
 
The newspaper added in the very next paragraph: 
 
Much of the finger-pointing has centered on the question of what responsibility 
global brands should bear for accidents that occur in the factories that produce 
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their garments. Some brands have been concerned that agreeing to participate in a 
compensation fund for Rana Plaza victims could be interpreted as an admission of 
guilt and become a vulnerability if litigation arises. 
 
This essentially justified the initial reluctance to and subsequent delay by some Western 
companies in committing money to the global compensation fund. Overall, the Western 
newspapers appeared willing to gloss over the failure of several Western companies to 
respond promptly by projecting the compensation fund as a breakthrough. The Guardian 
on June 11, 2015 quoted the representative of an international labor union as saying: 
 
The most important thing is that we did manage it — the workers of Bhopal are 
still waiting for their money 30 years later. Next time, let’s make sure we get the 
money faster so that we don't have years of painful campaigning in order to get 
$30m, which is peanuts in comparison to the profits of this sector. 
 
Again, the suggestion seemed to be that the compensation fund would not have 
materialized had there not been mediation by the West. In other words, the reports in the 
Western media had the strong undertone that international players had to join the 
compensation efforts because the Bangladesh government did not have the capacity for, 
and track record of, efficient management of such funds. The framing of the Western 
establishments in general as good Samaritans, in turn, provided them with moral 
superiority, which, coupled with their often touted skills and sophistication—technical, 
technological, and otherwise, afforded them a kind of legitimacy to decide and dictate the 
fate of Bangladesh’s garment industry. The Western newspapers trumpeted these 
dictations and decisions, too, as the best the industry in particular and the country in 
general could hope for. 
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Moving Forward or Back to More of the Same? 
In the immediate aftermath of the Rana Plaza collapse, Western retailers were in a 
bind. As the British and U.S. newspapers reported, their first impulse was to distance 
themselves from the factories housed in the ill-fated building. The New York Times 
reported on May 1, 2013: “Several American and European retailers have sought to 
minimize any ties they had to factories inside the building….” There were, according to a 
Washington Post editorial comment published on October 24, 2014, even “discussions 
about boycotting firms that do business in Bangladesh or punishing the country with 
trade restrictions.” At the same time, there were pushbacks against such talks of boycott 
and trade restrictions, with the major argument being that such measures would destroy 
the life and livelihood of millions of garment workers in Bangladesh and, worst still, 
bring the country’s economy crashing down. The New York Times on May 14, 2013 
quoted an influential member of the Bangladesh government as likening the country’s 
readymade industry with “the goose that lays the golden eggs,” which needed to be 
nurtured and strengthened, not killed. The Guardian on June 6, 2013 quoted the then 
British minister for international development as saying that Bangladesh’s garment 
industry was a “massive success story that must not be allowed to go sour.” He added:  
 
The industry has been built from nothing in the past 30 years and now needs to be 
turned into a long-term development success… Regulations and enforcement 
need to catch up with the rapid growth of this sector.” 
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The argument, thus, was not to punish the industry for sustained indifference to factory 
safety and other transgressions but bring it under a system that would address its many 
deficiencies and drawbacks. 
Besides developing their reports, features, and editorial comments around such 
positive and sympathetic quotes and comments, the Western newspapers would also 
advance, not so implicitly, humanitarian obligation as a further reason why Bangladesh’s 
apparel industry needed to be sustained and strengthened. There were even suggestions 
for overlooking gross malpractices that marked the industry. The Guardian, for example, 
wrote on June 7, 2013:  
 
The garment industry in Bangladesh employs about 3.5 million people, mainly 
young women… Pay at factories is better than in other industries and despite long 
hours, abuse from employers, poor job security and danger, sewing is less arduous 
than alternative employment such as agricultural labour, construction work, 
cleaning homes or ship-breaking. 
 
In other words, the British daily acknowledged the malpractices that blight the industry 
but maintained nonetheless that it was a price that workers had to pay because they had 
very limited viable alternatives. The Washington Post offered a similar line of argument 
in an editorial comment published on October 24, 2014:  
 
The clothing industry has largely been a blessing for Bangladesh, a densely 
populated country with huge amounts of spare workers seeking employment. 
Actual per capita gross domestic product and actual income have doubled since 
1997, in part because the country established itself as a center of ready-to-wear 
apparel manufacturing… Demands for worker safety should not become a pretext 




The major argument against any punitive Western measures against Bangladesh’s 
clothing industry was ultimately not about any humanitarian ethic, although the Western 
newspapers sought to project it as such. The Washington Post editorial dropped the hint 
when it described the “$22 billion garment manufacturing business” as “a crucial global 
production hub.” Simply put, the Western retailers could not afford to lose its service. 
However, they could not publicly admit their dependence on cheap labor in countries like 
Bangladesh that sustained their bottom line; they needed the cover of humanitarian ethic, 
and the Western newspapers provided it. 
The Western newspapers were critical of the Western retail chains’ tolerance of 
non-compliance by their Bangladeshi suppliers with fire safety and factory construction 
standards. The New York Times reported on May 14, 2013: 
 
For years, Bangladesh has seen some of the worst practices in the global garment 
industry. Wages are the lowest in the world, starting at roughly $37 a month. 
Factory conditions are often unsafe. Yet global brands have often sought to 
deflect any direct responsibility for the problems, while the government has often 
been tepid in protecting worker rights. 
 
The description followed right after the news that several European companies had 
agreed “to a landmark plan to help pay for fire safety and building improvements after 
the collapse last month of the Rana Plaza factory complex, which killed more than 1,100 
people.” However, the report was generally positive in its coverage of the agreement, and 
generously used positive quotes and comments about the European companies for leading 
the initiative. The H&M was especially highlighted: 
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H&M is the largest purchaser of garments from Bangladesh, and its endorsement 
was seen as influential to other brands. The agreement calls for independent, 
rigorous factory safety inspections with public accountability and mandatory 
repairs and renovations underwritten by Western retailers. It also enhances the 
roles played by workers and unions to ensure factory safety. 
 
Three days later, the U.S. daily reported two separate initiatives by religious groups and 
investors, imploring Walmart and other U.S. brands to join in the safety plan for 
Bangladesh’s garment industry. In an open letter, a coalition of 118 religious groups and 
investors urged these companies to reconsider their plans to institute individual factory 
inspection programs. The letter read: 
 
Acting alone, companies can and do bring about meaningful and positive changes 
in human rights in the countries where they source and manufacture. But when 
faced with intransigence of the type we have historically seen in Bangladesh on 
worker safety issues, we are convinced that systemic change will only occur when 
companies take action together. 
 
The other initiative featured a similar open letter that read: 
 
Regardless of whether products are being sourced from Bangladesh, Guatemala, 
China or the Philippines, morality dictates that the price/value calculus for all 
manufactured goods must begin with the fundamental human rights of workers… 
 
The letters fit well into the narrative that the New York Times and other Western 
newspapers advanced — that Bangladesh cannot improve the working condition in its 
apparel industry on its own and that the Western retailers are morally bound to work 
together and effect systemic change there.  
The Guardian, too, reported on July 4, 2013 the British government’s plan “to use 
its muscle to help drive up standards in factories supplying UK retailers” after the Rana 
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Plaza tragedy. Subsequently, the U.S. retailers did not join the European platform but 
launched their own factory safety initiative for Bangladesh. The two initiatives were 
generally described in favorable terms in the Western newspapers. The Washington Post 
on April 24, 2015 quoted an International Labor Organization official as touting the 
progress of the two initiatives as “unprecedented” and not done “anywhere else in the 
world… as quickly.” In sum, the West’s intervention was again projected as crucial, 
bringing about changes in the garment industry that Bangladesh could not have hoped 
for, let alone accomplish by itself. 
As the preceding discussion indicates, two key factors characterize the coverage 
of the Rana Plaza collapse and its aftermath by the newspapers under examination. First, 
despite certain points of emphasis (e.g., the cause of the collapse and its impact on the 
industry and individuals), the Western and Bangladesh newspapers framed the incident 
differently. The difference in the identification of problem function (i.e., accident/tragedy 
vs. murder) had a ripple effect on the other functions of the frames (i.e., diagnosis of 
cause, passage of moral judgement, and suggestion of remedy; see Entman, 1993). 
Second, the different frames that they deployed and their functions either informed or 
were informed by the different discourses that the foreign and local newspapers advanced 
or maintained surrounding the crisis. Despite the differences, these discourses also had at 
least one point of convergence, in (re)shaping and (de)centering the identity of the people 
who were most affected by the Rana Plaza incident: employees of the garment factories 
housed in the building. In the next section, I discuss how the identity of the dead and the 
wounded in the Rana Plaza collapse in particular and the Bangladeshi garment worker in 
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general was discursively (re)created and (re)negotiated by the Western and Bangladeshi 
newspapers. 
A Case of Convergence: Discursive (Re)creation of  
Worker/Victim Identity 
The hero in the Western media discourse (i.e., the Western companies/West) 
needed victims and found them in Bangladeshi garment workers, not just those killed or 
wounded in the Rana Plaza collapse but the entire population of around 4 million, mostly 
women. Right from the start of their coverage of the Rana Plaza disaster, the British and 
U.S. newspapers described the Bangladeshi garment workers as a collective with very 
little control over their life and livelihood. They worked long hours on the apparel factory 
floors, and endured abuse from employers, poor job security and danger because sewing 
was less arduous than agricultural labor, construction work, ship breaking, or home 
cleaning, and, more importantly, because if they did not do it someone else would since 
there were huge amounts of spare workers seeking employment in Bangladesh. The Rana 
Plaza incident, in the Western media discourse, encapsulated and amplified the 
helplessness and desperation that garment factory employees work with. Despite 
anxieties about the crack that had developed in the building, they still went into the 
factories and began working lest their refusal should render them jobless. On the other 
hand, rampant and sustained violation of factory safety standards and worker rights 
violation was the result of a general absence of trade unions in the country’s garment 
sector. Just as garment workers had to rely on the whims and wishes of their employers 
for their livelihood, the Rana Plaza victims and survivors also had to rely on the 
government, the factory owners’ association, the Western retail chains, the international 
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labor organizations for compensation. Overall, the Western media discourse lumped the 
Rana Plaza dead and wounded in particular and garment workers in general into a 
collective identity that was weak and helpless, denied and disempowered — the perpetual 
victims, in other words. 
The Western newspapers also used wage as a tool in their discursive construction 
of the identity of the Rana Plaza dead and wounded. In fact, these newspapers displayed a 
tendency to identify the dead or the wounded in terms of their wages. For example, in its 
April 26, 2013 report, the Guardian described one young woman who worked in one of 
the factories housed in the Rana Plaza: 
 
Fatema Khatun Moni, 21, said she had come to Dhaka to ensure a better living for 
her family back home in Naogaon. Her basic monthly wage was £38, £79 with 
overtime. With that amount she financed her younger daughter’s education and 
supported her parents. 
 
Similarly, the New York Times reported the predicament of a young woman who lost her 
sister in the Rana Plaza collapse: 
 
Like so many young women in the country, the two sisters had gotten work in 
garment factories to help support their families. Ms. Begum makes about $85 a 
month; her sister made $56. 
 
The identity marker thus was how much a person earned, not what they did on the factory 
floor. Such discursive constructions, in turn, made the determination of compensation of 
the Rana Plaza dead and wounded based on their lost income appear not just acceptable 
but also normal. A human life was, thus, priced at some $12,500 and a human limb a 
little less. 
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As noted earlier, the Bangladeshi newspapers were implicitly critical of the way 
that the compensation package for the Rana Plaza victims had been calculated. However, 
their criticism appeared to be about the flaw in the calculation, not about the reduction of 
identity that it entailed. Simply put, they might not have had any reservation if the Rana 
Plaza compensation package had not been calculated based on the same rate as that 
related to previous such industrial disasters. However, although these newspapers more 
often than not portrayed the people affected by the Rana Plaza collapse as helpless and 
reliant on national and international assistance, financial and otherwise, they did not paint 
the garment workers as a hapless and helpless lot. In their discourse, workers were 
willing to take to the street for their rightful dues. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have described how, despite emphasizing certain common points 
related to the Rana Plaza collapse and its aftermath, the Western newspapers advanced a 
discourse that was distinctively different from that advanced by the Bangladeshi 
newspapers. I have also traced the difference in how they framed the Rana Plaza collapse, 
arguing that the difference in problem identification subsequently led to differing cause 
diagnosis, moral judgement, and remedy suggestion functions of their news frames. In 
my discussion on the functions of the frames, across the first four sections of the chapter, 
I have offered instances of the Western media’s use of a discursive strategy that glorified 
the Western retail chains in particular and the West in general and, at the same time, 
undermined Bangladesh. In the process, as I have argued in the fifth section, the Western 
media discursively created the identity of anything Western as the quintessential hero 
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while the Rana Plaza dead and wounded and the employees of Bangladesh’s garment 
factories as the perpetual victims. I have also argued that the Bangladeshi media 
advanced a discourse that might not have fully countered the Western media discourse 
but nonetheless contradicted and critiqued some parts of it. In the next chapter, I discuss 
how the findings tie in with the research questions of my thesis and, importantly, relate to 




DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION(S) 
My thesis project takes as its point of departure the questions “What insights 
about crisis communication emerge in shifting from a traditional, functionalist to a 
postcolonial theoretical framework?” and “How do Western and Bangladeshi newspapers 
support and/or resist a colonial legacy in their framing of the Rana Plaza crisis?” Two 
core epistemological exigencies frame these questions. First, an inherently managerial 
commitment, functionalist/positivist theoretical orientation, and Western/U.S. bias render 
analysis and assessment of crisis and crisis communication (especially in non-Western 
setting by the dominant stream of crisis communication research and scholarship in the 
United States) somewhat limited in scope and coverage. Second, the media articulate 
local and postcolonial discourses when framing a crisis, advancing and/or maintaining 
ideologies that (re)construct the crisis and (re)create the identity of individuals and 
institutions that experienced the crisis. In this chapter, I discuss how the findings of my 
critical discourse analysis of reports, features, and editorial comments on the Rana Plaza 
collapse and its aftermath, by two newspapers each from the United Kingdom, United 
States, and Bangladesh, tie back to the research questions and epistemological 
assumptions that my thesis project is based on. 
This chapter is divided into four sections. In the first section, I discuss how the 
Guardian and Telegraph of the U.K., and the New York Times and Washington Post of 
the US, in their framing of the Rana Plaza collapse and its aftermath, facilitated a 
discourse that centers the Western apparel companies and the West by decentering the 
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dead and wounded in the disaster, and the millions of employees in the Bangladeshi 
apparel industry. I argue that the U.K. and U.S. newspapers’ discursive (re)construction 
of the Rana Plaza crisis, and (re)creation of the identity of individuals, institutions, and 
Bangladeshi government that experienced the crisis is colonial/imperial in both content 
and effect. Next, I discuss how these findings complicate certain taken-for-granted 
assumptions made by the dominant stream of crisis communication research and 
scholarship in the U.S. In the second section, I argue that the Bangladeshi newspapers (in 
some instances) contested the colonial/imperial discourse advanced by the foreign 
newspapers and that these resistances were more sporadic than systematic, which may 
reveal a lack of postcolonial awareness. However, I note that such sporadic discursive 
resistance has certain implications for practitioners and researchers of crisis 
communication. In the third and final section, I summarize how my thesis project 
addresses certain limitations inherent in the dominant crisis communication research and 
scholarship in the U.S. vis-à-vis crises in non-Western settings and, in the process, 
contributes to a growing call for alternative ways of approaching and analyzing crisis 
communication. I conclude with certain practical applications and heuristic directions 
that my thesis project offers. 
Discourse of Domination: Media Role in Crisis Redefined 
Entman (1993) defined framing as selecting and making salient certain aspects of 
an incident/issue “to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, 
moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation” (p. 52, emphasis in original). In 
case of the Rana Plaza collapse, the Western newspapers emphasized frequent factory 
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collapses and fires in Bangladesh’s readymade garment industry and thus defined the 
incident in question as “not a surprise,” “a disaster waiting to happen” or, in other words, 
an accident or tragedy that was inevitable and, hence, beyond anyone’s control. This 
definition subsequently led to diagnosing Bangladesh’s systemic dysfunctionality, 
governance failure, and governmental ineptitude as the cause. Bangladesh was projected 
as a primordial hinterland, so to speak, where the nexus between politics and business, 
rampant corruption, and ever-increasing socioeconomic inequity made such incidents as 
the Rana Plaza collapse and associated loss of lives and limbs a recurring reality, and 
rendered legal and judicial redress for people affected by these incidents elusive, if not 
non-existent. Such problem definition and causal interpretation, in turn, led to the moral 
evaluation that the authorities in Bangladesh were either unable or unwilling to 
adequately compensate the dead and wounded of the Rana Plaza collapse on the one hand 
and effectively initiate measures to prevent recurrences of such incidents on the other, 
and that it was a moral imperative for the Western companies and, by implication, the 
West to compensate the affected Bangladeshi apparel workers as acts of compassion 
amidst an unfolding humanitarian crisis. Finally, the accident/tragedy frame provided the 
treatment recommendation that the Western companies/West needed also to extend 
financial and technical assistance for effective safety and standards inspections and 
requisite corrective measures for apparel factories in Bangladesh so as to prevent 
recurrence of similar incidents in the future and thus make sure that the “massive success 
story” of Bangladesh’s garment industry does not “go sour.” 
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The accident/tragedy frame, in its different functions, thus facilitates a discourse 
that affords the Western companies/West, to borrow from Said (1978), a “positional 
superiority” in their various interactions and relationships with the Bangladeshi garment 
industry/Bangladesh wherein they never lose “the relative upper hand” (p. 7). It does so 
in two distinctive ways. First, the portrayal of the Rana Plaza collapse as an exclusively 
Bangladeshi problem effectively distances the Western apparel brands from any legal 
culpability and/or moral responsibility for the death and injury of the several thousand 
people who worked in the garment factories. Second, the characterization of their 
involvement in and contribution to the compensation fund and factory inspection 
initiatives as “the right thing to do” puts the Western companies on a moral high ground. 
This positional superiority of the Western companies/West is carefully maintained even 
when the Western media are critical of their past inactions and indifferences in respect of, 
say, low wages for Bangladeshi apparel workers and unsafe conditions of Bangladeshi 
apparel factories. These inactions and indifferences are, in fact, justified as acts of 
compassion. For example, according to the British and U.S. newspapers, the companies 
could have boycotted Bangladeshi apparel products as a punitive measure against these 
malpractices but such a boycott would have resulted in the collapse of Bangladesh’s 
garment industry and, in the process, adversely impacted the life and livelihood of 
millions of Bangladeshis. In other words, the newspapers seem to suggest that the 
decision not to boycott Bangladeshi products reflected farsightedness on the part of the 
Western companies/West, which Bangladeshis in general might not have readily 
recognized. The justification that the Western newspapers offered for the decision is, 
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thus, an extension of the logic that what the Western companies/West do is sometimes 
beyond the comprehension or capability of the Bangladeshis in general. 
This dichotomy between “what ‘we’ do and what ‘they’ cannot do or understand 
as ‘we’ do” (Said, 1978, p. 12) is also reinforced in the way local individuals and 
institutions that worked tirelessly during the Rana Plaza rescue operation are portrayed in 
the Western media. For example, although local fire fighters and service personnel 
worked for days on end, rescuing the wounded and recovering the dead from the rubble, 
the Western media discourse seeks to establish that they “could have saved more lives” 
but for their inability or unwillingness to use the thermal imaging and telescoping search 
cameras that the United Nations had provided Bangladesh with under a disaster 
management program funded partially by the British Department for International 
Development. In other words, the Western media overshadowed the heroics of the local 
fire fighters and service personnel with these people’s purported lack of appreciation for 
and/or ability to use the ‘sophisticated’ Western technology. Similarly, in case of the 
part-time teacher who, according to a Washington Post report dated September 8, 2013, 
“spent three days and nights mining the rubble for the living,” “searched the rows of 
remains for items—cellphones, nose rings, scraps of paper—that might help with 
identification,” and fought off “a pack of dogs that had gotten hold of an open body bag 
with a corpse inside” late one night, the focus is also on his apparent lack of emotional 
and psychological fortitude that has left him a psychological wreck self-medicating “with 
a cocktail of antidepressants.” Such accentuation of institutional failures and individual 
follies is unlikely to be coincidental since it, too, works towards maintaining the 
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positional superiority of the Western companies/West vis-à-vis Bangladeshi garment 
industry/Bangladesh. 
Overall, the impression that one will likely get from the Western media coverage 
of the Rana Plaza collapse and the crisis thereof is that, in Bangladesh, the social and 
political elite are corrupt and exploitative, the government is inept and governance 
nonexistent, and the people are well-intentioned but ill-equipped to take care of 
themselves, let alone others. The garment industry, the readers are reminded time and 
again, is a rare success story that, too, risks “go[ing] sour” amidst rampant malpractices 
ranging from low wages for workers to life-threatening working conditions. Importantly, 
these are often cast as “worker” (i.e., Bangladeshi) rather than managerial (i.e., Western) 
problems. The apparel workers, the readers are told, have to bear with the gross 
mistreatment and injustice because pay in the garment industry is better than other sectors 
and employment is difficult to come by in this densely-populated country. Here, it is 
important to point out that the typical Bangladeshi garment worker in the Western media 
discourse is a vulnerable young woman whose life revolves around the pittance that she 
gets in wage from the garment factory she works in. Much like the Egyptian courtesan 
that Flaubert encountered (Said, 1978), she too cannot speak for herself and needs to be 
“spoken for and represented” (p. 6). In sum, Bangladesh is discursively (re)constructed as 
being in the civilizational backwaters (i.e., dysfunctional system, absence of governance) 
and the people of Bangladesh being either ethically/morally compromised (i.e., corrupt 
and exploitative social and political elite) or financially/legally vulnerable (i.e., millions 
of unemployed people and millions more exploited workers). 
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The British and U.S. newspapers’ reports, features, and editorial comments on the 
Rana Plaza collapse and its aftermath discursively (re)construct Bangladesh and 
Bangladeshis as antithesis to the West/Western companies, much like the Orientalists 
(re)imagined the Orient and Orientals vis-à-vis the Occident and Occidentals (Said, 
1978). This discursive (re)production of the West/rest, us/them, self/other dichotomies is 
driven by a similar motivation of dominance. The (re)assertion of the West as “the 
normative center of the world” (Rao, 2011, p. 792) ultimately (re)produces the 
justification for the Western companies to decide that financial compensation, not judicial 
redress, is what the dead and wounded of the Rana Plaza collapse need, and to dictate the 
present and future of the Bangladesh apparel industry that, regardless of mortal risk to 
and endless exploitation of workers, production must continue and its “massive story of 
success must not be allowed to go sour.” 
Tyler (2005) noted that crisis renders the “dominant narrative” that an 
organization strives to advance/maintain about itself open to public contest (p. 567). The 
dominant stream of crisis communication research and scholarship in the United States 
often notes the media’s formidable capacity to spearhead this public challenge to an 
organization’s official story in view of their wider access and acceptability to the mass 
audience. Crisis communication scholars are unanimous that the media play a crucial role 
during crises (Sellnow & Seeger, 2013), advise organizations to maintain close links with 
the media (Fearn-Banks, 2009), and even suggest active participation in the media’s 
framing of crisis so organizations could maintain a positive image (Holladay, 2009). 
They are also unanimous that crisis managers should learn from previous high-profile 
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crises such as the Challenger explosion or the anthrax scare in the U.S. and be cautious 
but candid with the media during crisis events to avert similar fallouts. In sum, crisis 
communication scholars often portray the media as a potential and formidable threat to an 
organization’s image/reputation or another organization to be cultivated/exploited to 
further organizational goals (i.e., image repair/maintenance). 
The post-Rana Plaza collapse news coverage, especially by the Western media 
organizations, complicates this taken-for-granted dynamic between the media and the 
organization during a crisis, though. The Guardian, Telegraph, New York Times, and 
Washington Post generally advanced these companies’ world view (Grunig, 1989) and 
thus protected their interests. The Western media indeed criticized the international 
apparel brands based in North America and Europe on occasions but these criticisms did 
not, in any way, detract from their grand narrative about the Western companies and the 
West. On the contrary, these criticisms helped maintain their oft-trumpeted 
neutrality/objectivity and, in the process, reinforced the credibility of the discourse that 
they advanced/maintained. Millner, Veil, and Sellnow (2010) postulated how a third-
party organization, preferably an industry representative, can step in as proxy crisis 
communicators to fill the information void caused by the reticence/reluctance of the 
offending organization(s), with the objective of such communication often being defense 
of the offending organization(s) and the relevant industry. They also argued that proxy 
crisis communicators “cope with media adversity” (p. 75) among many other constraints. 
In case of the Rana Plaza crisis, however, the Western companies did not face any media 
adversity in the true sense of the term. In fact, they found in the media effective proxy 
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crisis communicators that ultimately repaired their collective image and defended their 
long-term interest due to the intersecting interests of neoliberal capitalism and colonial 
paternalism. 
The Western media could also be viewed as having played a public relations 
function in their discursive (re)construction of the Rana Plaza collapse and its aftermath 
and consequent (re)creation of identities of the institutions and individuals that 
experienced the crisis by affording the Western companies the relative upper hand 
through and through. Bergquist (1993) noted that every organization seeks to circulate a 
fiction in the name of an official story that “everyone is supposed to accept as true, yet 
which no one believes to be true” (p. 126). The Western media’s portrayal of the 
international apparel brands as morally responsive and socially responsible in their post-
Rana Plaza news coverage looks to be an extension of that fiction. Munshi and Kurian 
(2005) critiqued the notion of corporate social responsibility as resting “on a platform of 
insincerity … [that is] manifested in the privileging of key public such as shareholders 
over what are deemed to be peripheral publics (i.e., the masses of people who bear the 
brunt of corporate actions)” (p. 514). In case of the Rana Plaza crisis, the Western media 
actively privileged the interest of the Western companies by advancing/maintaining a 
discourse that first absolves them of any legal/moral responsibility for the incident and 
consequent loss of so many lives and then glorifies them as good Samaritans standing by 
Bangladeshi apparel workers, and not just the Rana Plaza dead and wounded, amid an 
unfolding humanitarian crisis. A compelling example of such privileging is their 
unqualified endorsement of the West-led international compensation initiative that 
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calculated the individual compensation package based on wages in the Bangladeshi 
garment industry that the Western media themselves have often critiqued as inadequate 
and inhumane. 
In this section, I have argued how a postcolonial theory-driven critical discourse 
analysis of the news coverage of the Rana Plaza collapse and its aftermath, especially by 
the Guardian and Telegraph of the United Kingdom, and the New York Times and 
Washington Post of the United States, complicates and challenges, on at least three 
counts, how the mainstream crisis communication research and scholarship in the U.S. 
explicates the role of the media vis-à-vis organizational crises. First, it is more productive 
to view the role of the media in terms of conveyors of and contributors to the social 
discourse surrounding a crisis — and not merely as a conduit in a linear communication 
process that channels to the public information they gather from and/or provided with by 
the organization. Such a recognition facilitates a better understanding of the media’s 
active and effective role in not just informing but also influencing the social discourse 
surrounding a crisis. Second, it is too simplistic to view the media exclusively as an 
adversary vis-à-vis the beleaguered organization/s during a crisis. Such a view precludes 
the possibility that the media can and may play the proxy crisis communicator and even 
the public relations manager for the organization/s in crisis when various dominant 
discourses (e.g., capitalism and colonialism) coalesce to create a coherent, preferred 
dominant script. Third, and perhaps most important, whether the mainstream Western 
media discourse surrounding a crisis will favor or disfavor the relevant organization/s is 
not necessarily consequent upon the candor and cooperation and/or caution exercised by 
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the crisis managers in their engagements with the media. As they are “largely subservient 
to corporate interests” (Kellner, 2005, p. 181), the mainstream corporate media are only 
likely to advance/maintain discourses that protect and promote such interests. 
In the next section, I discuss the limited discursive resistance offered by the local 
newspapers to the West-centered narrative advanced by their Western counterparts, and 
also explain why and how recognition of this resistance could be productive for crisis 
communication researchers and scholars. 
Discourse of Resistance: A Pushback from the Periphery 
A crucial difference in the post-Rana Plaza collapse coverage between the four 
Western and two Bangladeshi newspapers was in how they framed the crisis. The 
Financial Express and New Nation defined the death of more than 1,100 apparel workers 
in the Rana Plaza collapse as “murder,” caused by individual/institutional negligence. 
Such problem definition and causal interpretation shaped the other two functions of the 
frame — moral evaluation (i.e., owners of the building and the garment factors, and their 
cohorts should be prosecuted in criminal courts), and treatment recommendation (i.e., 
judicial redress is key to preventing to recurrence of such incidents in future). The 
discourse that the murder frame, with its various functions, informed/was informed by, 
albeit disjointed, differed from and was, to a certain extent, defiant of/resistant to the 
Western media discourse. 
A major instance of such resistance relates to how the Bangladeshi newspapers 
pushed back at the Western media’s discursive (re)production and reduction of the 
identities of the Rana Plaza dead and wounded as “victims” and thus without any agency. 
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They dedicated significant space to the coverage of demonstrations and agitations by the 
Rana Plaza workers for not just financial but also legal redress. Van Dijk (1993) noted 
that carrying placards and/or shouting slogans during such public events provides an 
avenue for the ordinary or marginalized people to access social discourse. Moreover, Kim 
and Dutta (2009) argued that such mobilizations signify the marginalized people’s 
agency on one hand and their engagement in crisis communication on the other. 
Significant coverage of these agitations and demonstrations by the local newspapers, 
therefore, sought to reclaim the agency for Rana Plaza workers, which the Western media 
tended to discursively take away from them. 
However, the local newspapers’ resistance to the discourse advanced/maintained 
by their Western counterparts was too sporadic and incoherent to be regarded a 
manifestation of their postcolonial awareness. For example, although these newspapers 
pushed back at the Western newspapers’ discursive denial of the Rana Plaza workers’ 
agency, they also unquestioningly accepted and deployed Western terms (e.g., victim) in 
their news reports, features, and editorials. Moreover, their criticism of the individual 
compensation packages for the dead and wounded of the Rana Plaza collapse was mostly 
directed at what they identified as flaws in the calculation process, not in the process by 
which Western companies granted themselves the power to initiate, fund, and ultimately 
control the compensation process (usurping a judicial remedy to the situation). Similarly, 
that these compensation packages also reduced the Rana Plaza workers’ identity into 
workers, determined only by their wages, did not appear to be much of the local 
newspapers’ concern. In other words, had their discursive challenges been enabled by a 
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postcolonial awareness, they would have strongly criticized such capitulation to Western 
capitalism and the reduction of Bangladeshis’ identity instead of accepting and 
perpetuating them. 
Yet, albeit inconsistent and incoherent, this (re)assertion of the Rana Plaza 
workers’ agency by the Bangladeshi newspapers, challenging the dominant British-U.S. 
media discourse surrounding the crisis, is significant for crisis communication research 
and scholarship in several ways. It shows how different individuals/institutions construct 
“their own social reality” surrounding a crisis and how these social realities “compete 
with each other” for ideological domination or, in other words, for collective acceptance 
as “right, just, or acceptable” (McHale et al., 2007, pp. 375–376). As is often the case, the 
reality of the marginalized people goes unsaid, unheard, and unheeded because, unlike 
business conglomerates, for instance, they do not have “access to the platforms of public 
sphere,” let alone “the power to control information” or the “agenda-setting power” (Kim 
& Dutta, 2009, p. 147). However, in disrupting the dominant narrative, a crisis creates 
opportunities for the marginalized people “to make their positions public and to elicit 
support” (Waymer & Heath, 2007, p. 106). Moreover, whose reality ultimately wins the 
discursive struggle for ideological dominance depends on the convergence of “power and 
influence in favor of particular players over others at a particular time” (McHale et al., 
2007, p. 378). The post-Rana Plaza collapse news coverage by the local newspapers 
suggests that the access to social discourse could be widening for the marginalized people 
and could over time afford them a stronger position in discursive (re)negotiations of 
reality, to successfully challenge the generally pro-Western corporate discourse. 
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The reports, features, and editorial comments on the Rana Plaza incident and its 
aftermath by the Financial Express and New Nation also indicate that local newspapers 
could be a productive site for exploration and examination of alternative discourses 
surrounding a crisis that occurs in a non-Western setting but involves Western 
organization/s. Globalization may have seen the rise of corporate media that largely serve 
Western interest (Artz, 2003; Kellner, 2005; Murphy, 2003) but it has also been marked 
by a “reassertion of local identities” (Christians, 2005, p. 3). In the event of a crisis 
involving Western companies and impacting Western corporate interest, this impulse to 
(re)claim and (re)assert local identities may lead local newspapers to seek out discourses 
that are different from, if not resistant to, the Western media discourse. 
In this section, I have discussed how the local newspapers discursively challenged 
the Western media narrative surrounding the Rana Plaza collapse and the crisis thereof. I 
have argued that, although limited, these challenges have implications for crisis 
communication research and scholarship. In the next section, I summarize how my thesis 
project highlights certain inherent weaknesses in the dominant strand of crisis 
communication research and scholarship in the United States and offers explain how it 
contributes to the growing call for a reconceptualization of crisis communication.  
Reconceptualizing Crisis Communication 
The organization-centricity of the mainstream crisis communication research in 
the United States has its roots in public relations research. Crisis communication is still 
viewed primarily as a public relations function (Fearn-Banks, 1996/2002). Moreover, as 
discussed in Chapter 1, public relations scholars have not only built the foundational 
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framework of crisis communication but also conducted the bulk of crisis communication 
research since its emergence as a discernible academic discipline. This organization-
centricity has resulted in an essentially reductionist conceptualization of crisis as a 
phenomenon that only disrupts an organization’s normal operations, and adversely affects 
its products and services, revenue and profit, publics or stakeholders, image and 
reputation, and crisis communication as a process that only an organization engages in to 
restore operational normality and minimize such negative impacts (Coombs, 2009, 2012; 
Fearn-Banks, 1996/2002; Seeger et al., 2003; Seeger & Sellnow, 2013). On the other 
hand, communication per se is viewed as a linear, top-down process where the message 
flows from the organization to its publics, and the receiver (i.e., the public/s) interprets 
and understands the message just as the sender (i.e., the organization) intends it to be 
interpreted and understood by the receiver (i.e., the public/s). In other words, the success 
and failure of crisis communication is seen in terms of the efficacy of the message; hence, 
the emphasis is on text without any consideration for context (Curtin & Gaither, 2005; 
Karlberg, 1996). This inordinate emphasis on text at the expense of context is the result 
of what could be called an ethnocentric understanding of organization and its publics, 
with the underlying assumption being that the Western/U.S. model for interaction 
between the organization and its publics is applicable across boundaries — geographical, 
cultural and otherwise (Lee, 2005; Wakefield, 1996). 
A great deal of crisis communication research in the U.S. locates “all power to 
respond and to manage a crisis in the organization” (McHale et al., 2007, p. 378). Even 
studies that purportedly assess and analyze the audience reaction to and reception of 
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crisis communication do so with a view to enhancing the efficacy of the organizational 
communicative practices and strategies (e.g., Smith et al., 2012). Even the role of the 
media, crucial in respect of their capacity for rapid dissemination of information and 
access to the masses (Seeger & Sellnow, 2013), is mostly theorized in relation to their 
reaction to the organization’s crisis management and crisis communication efforts (e.g., 
Littlefield & Quenette, 2007), as is the role of the government and other regulatory 
entities (e.g., Smithson & Venette, 2013). This postulation of the organization as the 
locus of power constrains the dominant crisis communication research in the U.S. — 
epistemologically, ontologically, and axiologically. Although ordinary people suffer 
infinitely more than an organization’s owners and managers (Heath, 2012), their crisis-
time communication is rarely explored as a productive site for crisis communication 
(epistemology). Similarly, crisis communication is seldom examined as discourse 
(ontology) and evaluated in terms of its role in maintaining or challenging power 
relations in society (axiology). Overall, the dominant stream of crisis communication 
research in the U.S. continues to overlook alternative epistemological, ontological, and 
axiological possibilities inherent in crisis communication in its preoccupation with the 
communicative practices and strategies put in place by an organization during crises, and 
their effectiveness or lack thereof. 
On the contrary, if crisis is conceptualized as a social phenomenon (Heath, 2012), 
a central feature of the postcolonial approach in my project, it decenters the organization 
as the sole source of power to respond to and manage a crisis and locates such power also 
“in the audiences and all kinds of institutions that relate to it” (McHale et al., 2007, 
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p. 378). Such a (re)conceptualization of crisis and crisis communication, in turn, 
foregrounds the discursive terrain whereby multiple sources such as the organization/s, 
regulators, activists, and, to a limited extent, even the marginalized people affected most 
by a crisis, compete with their respective realities about the crisis (Davis & French, 2008; 
Hearit & Courtright, 2003) for ideological dominance (McHale et al., 2007). Such 
diffusion of power to initiate and maintain crisis response also means displacement of the 
organization as the sole site to explore and examine crisis communication practices and 
strategies, and thus warrants recognition of many other productive sites for such 
exploration and examination, including but not limited to the media, both global and 
local.  
A focus on the discursive nature of crisis communication also foregrounds how 
communication in general perpetuates or challenges power relations in society. This 
attention to power dynamics renders problematic certain taken-for-granted assumptions 
of dominant crisis communication research and scholarship in the U.S. In case of the 
Rana Plaza crisis, for example, the Western media and the Western companies 
complemented, not competed, each other with a view to maintain a discourse that seeks 
to entrench West’s neoliberal capitalism and neocolonial paternalism. This interest 
convergence between the Western companies and the mainstream Western media could 
seem far-fetched if, following the logic and practices of the dominant strand of research 
and scholarship in the U.S., media coverage is analyzed as disparate texts, not as part of a 
discourse. As noted earlier, the British and U.S. criticized the Western companies on 
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occasions but these criticisms did not detract from the overarching discourse that favored 
these companies and, by implication, the West. 
Again, the implication of this reasoning is that it hardly leaves any space for crisis 
communication research and scholarship to claim, let alone assert, value-neutrality. The 
post-Rana Plaza crisis news coverage by the British and U.S. newspapers clearly 
obfuscates the moral responsibility of the Western companies in particular and the West 
in general for not effectively addressing, let alone redressing, the vulnerability of the 
workers to economic exploitation in terms of multiple malpractices in the Western-
financed Bangladeshi garment industry and even mortal danger in terms of the unsafe 
factories they work in. Theorizing on this obfuscation as either a communicative 
technique or a discursive strategy has to recognize not just its textual efficiency but also 
its contextual effect, which, in this case, is the perpetuation of a status quo that gives 
precedence to the financial benefit of the Western companies over the existential angst of 
the Bangladeshi garment workers.  
Implications and Future Directions 
A relative novelty of my thesis project is the deployment of postcolonial theory as 
a theoretical framework and critical discourse analysis as a methodological tool to 
analyze Western and Bangladeshi media discourse surrounding the Rana Plaza crisis. A 
postcolonial theory-driven critical discourse analysis as a crisis communication research 
protocol promises considerable heuristic possibilities especially in examining crisis 
involving Western companies in postcolonial societies. Such examinations could be 
helpful to understand if the apparent corporate and colonial/imperial bent in the Western 
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media discourse surrounding the Rana Plaza crisis is an exception or the norm. Also, 
given that Bangla the language of nearly the entire population in Bangladesh and Bangla-
language newspapers heavily outweigh their English-language counterparts in terms of 
circulation and access to the populace, it would be intriguing to carry out a comparative 
discourse analysis between these two types of publication. Such an analysis could be 
instructive insofar as assessment of their postcolonial awareness is concerned. In view of 
the English-language newspapers’ access to and influence on the social and political elite, 
and in view of a general tendency of the social and political elite in postcolonial countries 
to hold on to a colonial legacy, it could be interesting to see if these media organizations 
are enslaved by the colonial/imperial discourse or enabled by a postcolonial awareness. 
Conclusion 
My thesis project diverges from the dominant branch of crisis communication 
research and scholarship in the U.S. in its (re)conceptualization of crisis as social 
phenomenon and crisis communication as discourse vis-à-vis the Rana Plaza collapse and 
its aftermath. This foregrounding of the social dimension of crisis and the discursive 
dimension of crisis communication brings into focus how events are (re)constructed and 
identities are (re)produced, discursively, to maintain or challenge power relations in 
society. Most importantly, such (re)conceptualizations create the scope and space to 
question certain taken-for-granted assumptions of the mainstream crisis communication 
research in the U.S., as my analysis of the coverage of the Rana Plaza crisis by Western 
and Bangladeshi newspapers does in respect of the relational dynamics between the 
media and the organization(s) in crisis. 
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APPENDIX A 
A LIST OF SELECTED POST-RANA PLAZA COLLAPSE REPORTS, FEATURES, 
AND EDITORIALS IN SELECTED U.K. AND U.S. NEWSPAPERS 
 
(In order of publication dates — from the oldest to the newest) 
 
 Date Headline Newspaper 




02. -- Cries from the rubbles: ‘Save us brother, I 
beg you. I want to live’ 
Guardian 




04. 04/29/2013 Garment factory death toll rises as is 
arrested while trying to flee to India 
Guardian 








07. -- The most hated Bangladeshi, toppled from 
a shady empire 
New York 
Times 
08. -- Bangladesh discarded rescue cameras Telegraph 




10. -- British retailers failed to sign up to safety 
rules in Bangladesh factory 
Telegraph 
11. 05/04/2013 Disaster raises pressure for labor reform Washington 
Post 









14. 05/15/2013 Wal-Mart won’t sign Bangladesh accord Washington 
Post 
15. -- Inhuman conditions (editorial comment) Washington 
Post 




17. 05/23/2013 Report on deadly factory collapse in 
Bangladesh finds widespread blame 
New York 
Times 




19. 06/04/2013 Engineers warn 60% of garment industry 
buildings in Bangladesh at risk of collapse 
Guardian 
20. 06/06/2013 Bangladesh: Police fire at protest by 
collapsed factory staff 
Guardian 
21. -- Bangladesh garment industry under 
scrutiny following factory collapse 
Guardian 
22. 06/07/2013 Alive but alone: Survivors of factory 
disaster stitch together broken lives 
Guardian 
23. 06/08/2013 Primark says factory victims will soon see 
cash 
Guardian 




25. 07/03/2013 After disaster, Bangladesh lags in policing 
its maze of factories 
New York 
Times 
26. 07/04/2013 Government says retailers must help raise 
factory standards 
Guardian 




28. 10/23/2013 Rana Plaza factory disaster: Victims still 
waiting for compensation 
Guardian 
29. 11/23/2013 U.S. retailers decline to aid factory 




30. 11/30/2013 Christmas help for Rana Plaza victims Guardian 
31. 12/19/2013 After Bangladesh factory collapse, bleak 
struggle for survivors 
New York 
Times 








34. 02/24/2014 First companies give fund for victims of 
Bangladeshi clothing factory collapse 
New York 
Times 
35. 03/16/2014 Rana Plaza victims still awaiting 
compensation 
Guardian 
36. 03/17/2014 Workers still in fear but garment industry 
is thriving 
Guardian 
37. -- Primark pays $10m more to Rana Plaza 
victims 
Guardian 
38. 03/20/2014 Rana Plaza victims to get £1.2m in first 
payment 
Guardian 
39. 03/28/2014 US retailers’ donation to Bangladesh fund 
‘paltry’ 
Guardian 
40. 03/29/2014 3 retailers give aid to Bangladesh workers New York 
Times 
41. 04/16/2014 UN Rana Plaza fund still two-thirds short 
of target 
Guardian 
42. 04/24/2014 The fashion trade and the child labourer 
whose life was blighted in Rana Plaza 
Telegraph 
43. 04/28/2014 One year after Rana Plaza New York 
Times 
44. 06/19/2014 Rana Plaza disaster: Call for UK to press 
retailers over compensation fund 
Guardian 




46. 07/28/2014 Matalan refuses to fund UN scheme for 
Rana Plaza victims 
Guardian 
47. -- Campaigners target Matalan over disaster 
fund 
Telegraph 
48. 07/31/2014 Matalan makes late payment to Rana 
Plaza fund 
Guardian 
49. 10/24/2014 Unraveling a peril (Editorial comment) Washington 
Post 
50. 04/23/2015 Rana Plaza collapse: Compensation fund 
has $6m shortfall two years on 
Guardian 
51. 04/24/2015 Two years after Rana Plaza, have 
conditions improved in Bangladesh’s 
factories? 
Guardian 




53. 06/11/2015 Bangladesh Rana Plaza factory fund 






A LIST OF SELECTED POST-RANA PLAZA COLLAPSE REPORTS, FEATURES, 
AND EDITORIALS IN SELECTED BANGLADESHI NEWSPAPERS 
 
(In order of publication dates — from the oldest to the newest) 
 
 Date Headline Newspaper 
01. 04/25/2013 Rana Plaza had no RAJUK approval New Nation 
02. 04/26/2013 BGMEA demands death to culprits New Nation 
03. -- Counting dollars at the expense of workers Financial Express 
04. -- Savar tragedy triggers outcry worldwide Financial Express 
05. 04/27/2013 Govt in the dock for its incompetence New Nation 
06. 04/28/2013 Voice for justice gets louder New Nation 
07. -- Savar building collapse a man-made 
disaster 
Financial Express 
08. 04/29/2013 Rana arrested from Benapole Financial Express 
09. -- Owners fear unrest as factories open today Financial Express 
10. 04/30/2013 Rana placed on 15-day remand New Nation 
11. 05/01/2013 Arrest local MP Murad Jong New Nation 
12. -- Vested quarter out to destroy RMG 
industry, says BGMEA 
Financial Express 
13. 05/03/2013 Rana Plaza engineer held New Nation 
14. -- Rana Plaza tragedy: Savar Poura 
(municipality) mayor suspended 
New Nation 
15. 05/04/2013 Shop owners become paupers New Nation 
16. -- Hard lessons from Savar tragedy Financial Express 




18. -- CCC estimates 54m euros compensation 
for Rana Plaza victims 
Financial Express 
19. 05/23/2013 Probe panel finds 5 reasons New Nation 
20. -- Life sentence for Rana Plaza factory 
owners recommended 
Financial Express 
21. 05/26/2013 Pay for pain, sufferings New Nation 
22. 05/27/2013 US under lot of pressure over GSP facility New Nation 
23. 05/28/2013 BD must avoid Rana Plaza incident in 
future: Mozena 
Financial Express 
24. 05/30/2013 Canadian Loblaw outlines plan to help 
RMG workers 
Financial Express 
25. 06/01/2013 Compensation money eludes families of 
Rana Plaza victims 
Financial Express 
26. 06/06/2013 UK offer for RMG sector reform New Nation 
27. 06/09/2013 Primark begins paying compensation New Nation 
28 06/27/2013 BGMEA holds Rana Plaza, 5 RMG 
owners responsible for disaster, shirks its 
responsibility 
Financial Express 
29. 07/06/2013 RMG exports up over 16pc in April-May 
this year 
Financial Express 
30. 07/15/2013 Are RMG buildings safe to operate? New Nation 
31. 07/25/2013 CCC calls meeting of brands in BD to fix 
compensation for victims 
Financial Express 
32. 12/08/2013 GSP suspension & Bangladesh RMG 
sector 
New Nation 
33. 09/03/2013 US won’t buy apparels stained with BD 
workers’ blood: Mozena 
Financial Express 
34. 09/09/2013 Pressure rising on brands to sign BD 
safety accord 
Financial Express 




36. 10/23/2013 ACC not yet taken any action against Rana New Nation 
37. 10/24/2013 Compensation for Rana Plaza tragedy 
victims still a far cry 
Financial Express 
38. 01/21/2014 Tk 1.45m for each of the dead, missing, 
disabled 
Financial Express 
39. 02/14/2014 All attention to GSP action plan New Nation 
40. 03/12/2014 Safety problems still need to be resolved New Nation 
41. 03/23/2014 European parliamentary team arrives 
tomorrow to assess post-Rana progress 
Financial Express 
42. 04/17/2014 Compensations continue to elude Rana 
Plaza victims 
Financial Express 
43. 04/20/2014 Global buyers not raising prices despite 
compliance: BGMEA 
Financial Express 
44. 04/22/2014 Disbursement of donations not transparent New Nation 
45. 04/25/2014 Tears for dead and maimed comrades New Nation 
46. 10/03/2014 1,587 Rana Plaza victims get help from 
ILO-managed fund 
Financial Express 
47. 12/22/2014 Compensation estimate cut by $10m Financial Express 
48. 04/22/2015 No major progress in compensation Financial Express 
49. 04/25/2015 Tears for Rana Plaza victims New Nation 
 
